



## 16th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition, Washington, D. C.

2-4 February 2005

### 16th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition Agenda

#### Keynote Address: "An Ambassador's Perspective on Operations"

- Honorable Clifford M. Sobel, US Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

#### The Strategic Environment: The US Perspective

- Coalition Operations: The Strategic Environment: Observations from a U.S. and NATO Perspective, by Major General Ken Bowra, USA (Ret), Former Director of Operations for Allied Forces Europe
- Intelligence Support to Allied and Coalition Operations: Strategic Environment for Coalition Warfare, by Lieutenant General William G. Boykin, USA, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting Support

#### Partners' Perspectives on Coalition Special Operations

- Coalition Special Operations: The Netherlands Perspective", by Major General Peter Cobelens, Ministry of Defense, Director of Operations
- Coalition Special Operations: "British Perspective", by Colonel David Hopley, Deputy Commander, Headquarters United Kingdom Special Forces
- Coalition Special Operations: "French Perspective", by Brigadier General Benoit Puga, Commander Special Operations Command

#### "Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in Current and Future Conflicts"

- Brigadier General David N. Blackledge, USA, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
- Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, USA (Ret), Vice President, Corporate Development, Special Operations Command Support, SAIC
- Brigadier General John H. Kern, USAR, Former Commander, 352nd Civil Affairs Command
- Brigadier General Steven C. Speer, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, 193rd Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard
- Colonel Michael G. Rose, USA, Chief of Staff, US Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
- Colonel John A. Toolan, USMC, Director, Command and Staff Department, USMC University
- Mr. Eric P. Michael, Assistant Vice President, SAIC

#### "SO/LIC Training, Education, Gaming, and Simulations: Education and Training"

- Mr. Scott Moore, Joint Special Operations University, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
- Colonel Steven Howard, USAF, US Special Operations Command, SOFK

#### "Low Intensity Conflict - Capabilities and Gaps"

- Mr. Frank Wattenbarger, Director, Advanced Technology, Special Operations and Logistics Center, USSOCOM

#### "Role of Contractors in Worldwide Coalition Warfare"

- Major General John Longhouser, USA (Ret), President, MTC Technologies, Inc.
- Dr. Mal Macgown, Chief Executive, TOR International
- Mr. Craig A. Peterson, KBR Vice President Contingency and Homeland Operations, Halliburton, Inc.  
(Presentation not approved for distribution.)

#### Keynote Address: "The Way Ahead for Coalition Warfare"

- Honorable Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

#### "View of Coalition Warfare from the Leadership of the Theater Special Operations Commands"

- Coalition Operations: SOCSOUTH Perspective, by Colonel James A. Campbell, Director of Operations, Special Operations Command - South
- Coalition Operations: SOCEUR Perspective, by Colonel Mark D. Rosengard, USA, Director of Operations, Special Operations Command - Europe
- Coalition Operations: SOCCENT Perspective, by Major General Gary L. Harrell, USA, Commander, Special Operations Command - Central

# NDIA SO/LIC DIVISION



16<sup>th</sup> Annual SO/LIC Symposium  
2 - 4 February 2005





# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

## **7:45 AM - Welcome & Opening Remarks**

- Opening Remarks: Colonel Thomas E. “Tim” Davidson, USAF (Ret); Chairman, SO/LIC Division and Chairman, 16<sup>th</sup> Annual SO/LIC Symposium
- NDIA Welcome: Lieutenant General Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., USAF (Ret), President & CEO, NDIA
- Symposium Program Introduction: Colonel John J. “Jeff” Ellis, USA (Ret), Vice Chairman, 16<sup>th</sup> Annual SO/LIC Symposium
- Administrative Announcements: Colonel Thom Beres, USAF (Ret), Vice Chairman, 16<sup>th</sup> Annual SO/LIC Symposium



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

**8:00 AM - Keynote Address:**

*“An Ambassador’s Perspective on Operations”*

- The Honorable Clifford M. Sobel, US Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

**9:00 AM - Coffee Break in Cotillion Foyer**



# 16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005

9:30 AM – “*The Strategic Environment: The US Perspective*”

- Moderator: Major General Kenneth R. Bowra, USA (Ret), Senior Program Manager, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

“*Intelligence Support to Allied and Coalition Operations*”

- Lieutenant General William G. Boykin, USA, Deputy to the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting Support

“*DoD Policy for Coalition Warfare: The SO/LIC Perspective*”

- Mr. James Q. Roberts, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, OASD(SO/LIC)

“*US Policy for Coalition Warfare: Department of State Perspective*”

- Ambassador John R. Dinger, Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

**11:00 AM - Lunch in Exhibit Hall**

**12:45 PM - Partners' Perspectives on Coalition  
Special Operations in Cotillion Ballroom**



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

## **Administrative Announcements**

- Turn off cell phones or select vibrate setting
- Phone Number for Messages 202-328-2000
  - Then ask for NDIA Registration Desk
- Ready Room for Speakers-Eisenhower
- Lunch in Exhibit Area 11:00 AM – 12:35 PM
- Reception in Exhibit Hall 5:30 PM – 6:50 PM
- Banquet in Cotillion Ballroom 7:00 PM – 9:00 PM
  - Attire: Men: Business Suit / Women: Dress or Business Suit / Military: Service Dress
- Feedback on Symposium to Colonel Gene Russell, Vice Chairman, NDIA SO/LIC Division



# 16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005

12:45 PM - Partners' Perspectives on Coalition Special Operations

- Moderator: Major General Kenneth R. Bowra, USA (Ret )

*“Coalition Special Operations: French Perspective”*

- Brigadier General Benoît Puga, Commandant Special Operations Command

*“Coalition Special Operations: Australian Perspective”*

- Brigadier Tim McOwan, Deputy Special Operations Commander

*“Coalition Special Operations: British Perspective”*

- Colonel David Hopley, Deputy Commander, HQ United Kingdom Special Forces

*“Coalition Special Operations: Dutch Perspective”*

- Lieutenant Colonel Henk G. Van den As, Chief, Policy and Planning Branch, KCT

*“Coalition Special Operations: German Perspective”*

- Lieutenant Colonel Andraes Joedecke, German Special Forces, KSK

*“Coalition Special Operations: Polish Perspective”*

- Brigadier General Jan Kempara, Assistant Chief of Staff SOF, Polish Armed Forces



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

**3:00 PM – 5:30 PM -- BREAKOUT SESSION 1**

*“Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in Current and Future Conflicts”*

Moderators: Colonel Al DeProspero, USA (Ret), ORSA Corporation, and Mr. Doug Brown, SAIC.

Location: COTILLION NORTH

Panel Members:

- Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, USA (Ret), VP Corporate Development, SAIC
- Mr. Eric P. Michael, Assistant VP, SAIC
- Brigadier General David N. Blackledge, USA, Commander 352 Civil Affairs Command
- Brigadier General John H. Kern, USA, Former Commander 352 Civil Affairs Command
- Brigadier General Steven C. Speer, USAF (Ret), J-5/7, Pennsylvania Air National Guard
- Colonel Michael G. Rose, USA, Chief of Staff, USA Special Warfare Center and School
- Colonel John A. Toolan, USMC, Director, Command and Staff Dept., USMC University



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

**3:00 PM – 4:15 PM -- BREAKOUT SESSION 2A**

*“SO/LIC Training, Education, Gaming, and Simulations: Education and Training”\*

**Moderator:** Brigadier General Paulette Risher, USA, Commander JSOU; Director,  
USSOCOM J-7/9

**Facilitators:** Ms. Lexi Alexander, Northrop Grumman Mission Systems and Colonel  
Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret), ADG, Ltd.

**Location:** HARDING

**Panel Members:**

- Mr. Scott Moore, Joint Special Operations University, CT Fellowship Program
- Dr. Joseph Stuart, Dean of Academics, Joint Special Operations University
- Colonel David Hopley, Deputy Commander, HQ United Kingdom Special Forces
- Captain David Morrison, Commander, Special Operations Command-JFCOM





# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

**4:15 PM – 5:30 PM -- BREAKOUT SESSION 2B**

*“SO/LIC Training, Education, Gaming, and Simulations: Gaming and Simulations”*

**Moderator:** Brigadier General Paulette Risher, USA, Commander JSOU; Director,  
USSOCOM J-7/9

**Facilitators:** Ms. Lexi Alexander, Northrop Grumman Mission Systems and Colonel  
Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret), ADG, Ltd.

**Location:** HARDING

**Panel Members:**

- Mr. David J. Ozolek, Executive Director, Joint Futures Lab (J9), USJFCOM
- Colonel Steven Howard, USAF, US Special Operations Command, SOFK
- Professor L. Eric Kjonnerod, Division Chief and Senior Fellow, Security Strategy and Policy Division, National Strategic Gaming Center, National Defense University
- Colonel Jonas Blank, USAF, Senior Fellow, Security Strategy and Policy Division, National Strategic Gaming Center, National Defense University
- Mr. William Simpson, US Marine Corps Warfighting Lab



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

**3:00 PM – 5:30 PM -- BREAKOUT SESSION 3**

*“Low Intensity Conflict – Capabilities and Gaps”*

Moderator: Lieutenant Colonel A. James Diehl, USMC (Ret), SAIC

Location: COOLIDGE

Panel Members and Topics:

- Brigadier General Robert Neller, USMC, Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policy, and Operations, HQMC, *“Challenges of Low Intensity Conflict”*
- Brigadier General Joseph Votel, USA, Director IED Task Force, G-3, HQDA, *“Improvised Explosive Devices”*
- Mr. Jeffrey “Jeb” Nadaner, DASD(Stability Operations), OASD(SO/LIC), *“Stability Operations”*
- Mr. Frank Wattenbarger, Director, Advanced Technology, Special Operations and Logistics Center, USSOCOM, *“Future Technology Requirements”*



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

**3:00 PM – 5:30 PM -- BREAKOUT SESSION 4**

*“Role of Contractors in Worldwide Coalition Warfare”*

**Moderator: Mr. William E. Strang, President, Tactical and Survival  
Specialties, Inc. Location: COTILLION SOUTH**

**Panel Members:**

- **Mr. Eric D. Prince, CEO & Founder, Blackwater USA**
- **Major General John Longhouser, USA (Ret), President MTC Technologies, Inc.**
- **Dr. Mal Macgown, Chief Executive, TOR International**
- **Mr. Craig A. Peterson, KBR Vice President Contingency and Homeland Operations, Halliburton, Inc.**



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 3 February 2005**

**3:00 PM – 5:30 PM -- BREAKOUT SESSIONS**

- Session 1 – “*Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in Current and Future Conflicts.*” Moderators: Colonel Al DeProspero, USA (Ret), ORSA Corporation, and Mr. Doug Brown, SAIC. Location: COTILLION NORTH
- Session 2 A&B – “*SO/LIC Training, Education, Gaming, and Simulations.*” Moderator: Brigadier General Paulette Risher, USA, Commander JSOU; Director, USSOCOM J-7/9. Facilitators: Ms. Lexi Alexander, Northrop Grumman Mission Systems and Colonel Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret), ADG, Ltd. Location: HARDING
- Session 3 – “*Low Intensity Conflict – Capabilities and Gaps.*” Moderator: Lieutenant Colonel A. James Diehl, USMC (Ret), SAIC. Location: COOLIDGE
- Session 4 – “*Role of Contractors in Worldwide Coalition Warfare.*” Moderator: Mr. William E. Strang, Tactical and Survival Specialties, Inc. Location: COTILLION SOUTH



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 4 February 2005**

## **7:45 AM - Welcome & Opening Remarks**

- Opening Remarks: Colonel Thomas E. “Tim” Davidson, USAF (Ret); Chairman, SO/LIC Division and Chairman, 16<sup>th</sup> Annual SO/LIC Symposium
- Symposium Program Agenda: Colonel John J. “Jeff” Ellis, USA (Ret), Vice Chairman, 16<sup>th</sup> Annual SO/LIC Symposium
- Administrative Announcements: Colonel Thom Beres, USAF (Ret), Vice Chairman, 16<sup>th</sup> Annual SO/LIC Symposium



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 4 February 2005**

**8:00 AM - Keynote Address:**

*“The Way Ahead for Coalition Warfare”*

- The Honorable Thomas W. O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

**8:45 AM - Coffee Break in Exhibit Hall**



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 4 February 2005**

9:30 AM - *“View of Coalition Warfare from the Theater SOCs’ Perspectives”*

Moderator: Colonel Tim Davidson, USAF (Ret), Chairman, SO/LIC Division

Panel Members:

- Major General Gary L. Harrell, USA, Commander, SOC-CENTRAL
- Colonel James A. Campbell, USA, Director of Operations, SOC-SOUTH
- Colonel Mark D. Rosengard, USA, Director of Operations, SOC-EUROPE
- Colonel Joseph D. Clem, USAF, Deputy Commander, SOC-KOREA

11:15 AM – Break in Exhibit Hall

12:00 PM – Lunch in Cotillion Ball Room

Keynote Address: *“Lessons Learned from Coalition Operations Around the World”*

General Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, USA, Commander, US Special Operations Command



# **16<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium 4 February 2005**

## **Administrative Announcements**

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- Messages at NDIA Registration Desk
- Lunch in Cotillion Ball Room, 12:00 PM
- Feedback on Symposium to Colonel Gene Russell,  
Vice Chairman, NDIA SO/LIC Division



# **United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)**



**NDIA SO/LIC Symposium**

***BG David N. Blackledge  
3 February 2005***



# USACAPOC(A)

## Mission

Organize, train, equip, and validate Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers and units for worldwide support to Combatant Commanders and U.S. Ambassadors.



# Command Relationships



★★★★  
**USSOCOM**



————— Combatant Command  
- - - - - Command

HQDA

★★★  
**USASOC**



**AFSOC**



**NSWC**



**JSOC**



★★  
**USACAPOC**

★★

**USASFC**

★★

**USAJFKSWC**



75th  
RGR RGT



160th  
SOAR



**SOSCOM**



96

CA Bn



350

CA Cmd



351

CA Cmd



352

CA Cmd



353

CA Cmd



2

PSYOP Gp



4

PSYOP Gp




7

PSYOP Gp



# USACAPOC(A)

## Authorized Command Strength



	Strength	Percent of Command	
<b>Civil Affairs (USAR)</b>	<b>5,501</b>	<b>61%</b>	<b>86%</b>
<b>Psychological Operations (USAR)</b>	<b>2,239</b>	<b>25%</b>	
<b>Psychological Operations (AC)</b>	<b>1,136</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>14%</b>
<b>Civil Affairs (AC)</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>2%</b>	





# Civil Affairs Functions

- Reduce civilian interference with military operations.
- Help restore and maintain public order.



- Safeguard, mobilize, and use local resources.
- Facilitate the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies and services.



# Psychological Operations

## Functions

- Commander's primary means to talk to foreign target audiences
- Directly and indirectly influence attitudes and behavior
- Identify objectives, themes, actions, and messages
- Develop, package, and disseminate media (audio, video, graphic, photographic, and print)





# CA & PSYOP Support to the Global War on Terrorism





# Civil Affairs

## Operation Iraqi Freedom

- Assisted the re-opening of schools to ensure students completed year-end exams.
- Coordinated contracts to clear irrigation canals.
- Facilitated daily coordination between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local, regional, and national Iraqi Government offices.







# Civil Affairs

## Operation Iraqi Freedom

- Assisted in the formation, training, and implementation of neighborhood, district, and city councils.
- Focused on the principles of democracy, free speech, minority representation, and self-governance.





# Civil Affairs

## OEF-Horn of Africa

- CA Soldiers conducted an ENCAP in Ethiopia that replaced a school building with a concrete structure that serves 400 children.



- In Kenya, CA medical teams average two MEDCAPs per month lasting one to seven days.



# PSYOP

## Operation Iraqi Freedom

- During the battle for An Nasariyah in April 2003, tactical PYSOP used loudspeaker of armored deceive the believing an was preparing to attack.








# PSYOP

## Operation Iraqi Freedom

- PSYOP supported the “Cash for TIPS Program” with radio and TV programs



as well as  
leaflet design/  
dissemination

to encourage more informants to  
provide the location of weapons  
caches and identify former regime  
loyalists.





# CA & PSYOP

## Operation Iraqi Freedom

### The New Iraqi Currency Exchange Program

- Civil Affairs coordinated with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, identified banks capable of handling the exchange, and assisted the contractors hired to deliver the new currency.



- PSYOP produced leaflets with images of the new currency and instructions for exchanging old dinars for new.





# USACAPOC(A) Summary

**Shape the operational environment**

**Enable rapid, decisive maneuver**

**Enhance the transition to peace**

*“Persuasive engagement*


*vs.*

*decisive engagement”*

# Coalition Operations

The Strategic Environment: Observations  
from a U.S. and NATO Perspective

MG (Ret.) Ken Bowra





# Field Marshal Sir Arthur Wellesly, First Duke of Wellington

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*“The only thing worse than an Alliance is no Alliance at all.”*

Wellington's Waterloo Dispatch following the Battle of Waterloo:

*“I should not do justice to my feelings or Marshal Blücher and the Prussian Army, if I did not attribute the success of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them.”*

# Coalition Observations

- The enemy will see a coalition as one of the most important centers of gravity, and will focus his efforts to disrupt and destroy it.
- Each coalition partner brings unique experiences and special skills to the battlefield. The key is to properly employ them to maximize capabilities.
- Respect coalitions partners National restrictions or limitations.

# Coalition Observations (Continued)

- Never, ever, coerce a coalition commander to accept a mission beyond his authority.
- Interoperability goes way beyond equipment. The key is to be able to operate together in a challenging environment.
- Understand and respect coalition members customs and cultures.
- Language...Language...Language: Have qualified linguist to work with coalition members.

# Coalition Observations (Continued)

- Always plan for Coalition Support Teams in an operation.
- A coalition must speak with one voice.
- Listen to coalition members.
- Figure out HOW to share National intelligence with coalition partners. Not sharing, or the perception of not sharing, may do more damage to the coalition than the enemy ever will be able to do.

# Coalition Observations (Continued)

- Do not wait for a crisis or Force Generation Conference to build a coalition. Coalition building is a continual effort and national process.

***“Geography has made us neighbors.  
History has made us friends.  
Economics has made us partners,  
and necessity has made us allies.  
Those whom God has joined  
together, let no man put asunder.”***

***– John F. Kennedy***

# *Intelligence Support to Allied and Coalition Operations*

*16th Annual SO/LIC Symposium  
Strategic Environment for Coalition Warfare  
3 Feb 2005*



# *Questions In Today's War*

- *When we conduct a combat operation (e.g. capture of an HVT) to gather intelligence... is that “intel” or “ops”?*
- *What's the difference between a “Title 50” and “Title 10” Operation?*
- *Are we sharing information among Coalition partners as well as we should?*

# *Key Issues*

- *If you want “Actionable Intelligence,” you must take “Action” first*
- *Future military conflicts will be a “Fight for Knowledge” for both General Purpose and Special Operations Forces. Everyone is an intelligence collector.*

# *All-Source Analysis*

- *The Intelligence Community is responsible for Competitive Analysis*
  - *Competitive Analysis depends on access to the same data*
- *Sharing “raw” data is our challenge*
  - *Cold War model depends on “finished products”*
  - *Today’s challenge requires access to raw data*
  - *Tension between “need to know” and “need to share”*


# *Coalition Intelligence Information Sharing “Today”*

- *IAW the President’s intent in E.O. 13356: DoD is aggressively pursuing mechanisms to share information and intelligence among all who need it, including Coalition partners*
- *The U.S. and Coalition partners have already made significant strides in sharing critical intelligence*
- *Current Coalition Sharing Capabilities:*
  - *US LOCE (Linked Ops-Intel Centers – Europe)*
  - *BICES (Multi-National Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System – NATO)*
  - *CENTRIXS (Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System – Worldwide)*

# *Coalition Intelligence Information Sharing “Today”*

- *These systems provide a robust infrastructure for:*
  - *e-mail and web services*
  - *common intelligence picture (data bases/ imagery)*
  - *common operational picture (track data)*
  - *secure voice*
  - *collaboration and chat*
- *These capabilities allow users to share critical information and intelligence on this robust architecture across:*
  - *Combatant Commands*
  - *Components*
  - *Embassies*
  - *Allies/Coalition forces*
- *They have been used and validated in real world operations to include: OEF, OIF, ISAF, and Tsunami relief*

# *Multi-National / NATO - Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems (BICES)*



- *Support current Nation and NATO led operations*
- *Ensure new NATO Nations are connected*
- *Provide expanded connectivity to Non-NATO nations and organizations as required*
- *Support the transformation of NATO*
- *Where possible, ensure BICES capabilities are focused on deployability and usability*

**The NATO BICES Agency is currently supporting multiple on-going NATO/EU operations**





# Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS)



# *Improving Information Sharing*

## *Series of Demonstrations and Exercises*

- *Trial Hammer (Apr 05)*
  - *First-ever NATO demonstration focused on Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)*
  - *Demonstrates a new NATO ELINT standard based on a common format*
- *Empire Challenge (Oct 05)*
  - *Coordinates and Demonstrates UK/AUS/US Airborne Imagery interoperability*
- *MAJIC (Multi-Sensor Aerospace/Ground Joint ISR Interoperability – Coalition)*
  - *April 05 - ACTD Sponsored by JFCOM*
  - *Introduces the DCGS Integrated Backbone (DIB) architecture to key allies*

# *NATO Intelligence Fusion Cell*

*Organization capable of providing effective , fused Theater strategic and U.S. reinforcing operational intelligence support to NATO operations with:*

- *Flexibility and agility for immediate response to emerging missions and crises
  - **Capable of supporting current NATO operations and expanding for a NRF deployment***
- *Standing reach-back within AOR and out of area*
- *Stay within existing agreements and treaties*
- *Create a core of allies experienced in common TTPs*
- *Focused allied integration with JAC to assist partners in sharing intelligence requirements*
- *Establish more responsive request for information (RFI) processes*
- *Develop new business process to create functional partnerships and maximize theater analytic capabilities*

# *Operationalizing Intelligence*

- *Cold War Model:*
  - *Intelligence is primarily a staff function*
  - *Intelligence activities support Operations*
- *New Model: Where our main challenge is Finding the adversary*
  - *Intelligence is a Warfighting function*
  - *Intelligence activities are Operations*
  - *We need Intelligence Components to parallel the Ground, Air, Maritime, and SOF Components*

# *Intelligence Campaign Plans*

- *Cold War Model:*
  - *Warplans assign tasks and responsibilities to traditional maneuver forces only*
  - *The C/J2 conducts necessary intelligence work*
- *New Model:*
  - *Build Campaign Plans that synchronize and integrate all Intelligence Operations to achieve military objectives*
  - *Win the Intelligence Fight long before and long after a military conflict*
  - *Include Coalition numbers in the Campaign Plans*

# *Questions*





# *Coalition Operations*

SOC SOUTH Perspective



# *Agenda*




SOUTHCOM AOR Overview


Current Coalition Operations

JIATF-S; Model for coalition operations

Enablers

# Strategic Importance







# *SOUTHCOM AOR Overview*




- OAS/IADB
- Impediments we must overcome to establish effective multi-lateral security arrangements
  - Principle of non-intervention/Respect of national sovereignty
  - Fear of U.S. domination
  - Historical role of Latin American militaries
  - Differing strategic and threat perceptions
  - U.S reserves the right to act unilaterally
  - Preference of sub-regional groupings

# Coalition Contributions Worldwide



As of Oct 2004







# JIATF-South's Integrated Team



## A Combined, Joint, Interagency Command



**Liaison Officers are critical to the synchronization of regional operations**

## U.S. Interagency Presence in JIATF Command Structure.

Examples:

- Director: USCG
- Dep J2: DEA
- Dep J3: CBP
- Watch Floor: USCG, CBP
- Joint, Interagency Planners: USCG, CBP
- C4I: USCG
- Intel Analysts: Multiple Interagency

**- Intel Fusion  
- Planning  
- Operations**


# JIATF-South's JOA



US/MX Border

Total: 42 million square miles


U.S. = approximately 8 million square miles



# The JIATF-S CNT Process



*Interdiction & Investigation*






# Bilateral and Multilateral Operations



*1-2 on any given day*






# US and Allied Ships



*12+ on any given day*








# US and Allied Aircraft



15+ On Any Given Day





# *Coalition Building Enablers*



- Deployments
  - CNT
  - JCETs
  - PSE
  - CMRS
- JCS Exercises
- CT Fellowship Program
- TCA/LATAM Coop events
- Personnel Exchange Program (PEP)





# *SOF Deployments*



**FY 04: SOF personnel deployed  
on **222** missions to **24** Countries**

## **Personnel Trained 4<sup>th</sup> QTR 04 & 1<sup>st</sup> QTR 05**

Colombia: 3,497

Panama: 31

Bolivia: 144

Paraguay: 104

Peru: 30

**TOTAL PAX: 3,806**





# Exercise *FUERZAS COMANDOS*



- **Concept of Operations**
  - Theater-wide CBT competition
  - Senior Leader CT Symposium
- **Purpose**
  - Enhance multinational and regional cooperation
  - Develop mutual trust and confidence
  - Improve training, readiness, and interoperability of CT/SOF
- **16 Participating Nations:** Chile (host), Argentina , Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, *Venezuela*



# *FC FY 06-08 Way Ahead*



- Develop a phased exercise around GWOT:
  - CT Competition to assess capabilities of LATAM PN CT teams
  - Senior Leadership Seminar dedicated to resolving regional CT issues at the decision-maker level
  - Transnational CPX
  - Bilateral/multilateral FTXs
  - Supports Regional CT Center concept



# Summary



- SOUTHCOM countries are actively engaged in PKO operations worldwide.
- Bilateral engagements are the most effective, however, by synchronizing JCS Exercises, the CT Fellowship program and our training deployments we can create the initial capability to develop ad hoc coalitions to support our WOT efforts.
- JIATF-S conducts effect coalition operations everyday.



# **KORPS COMMANDOTROEPEN** **ROYAL NETHERLANDS ARMY** **SPECIAL FORCES REGIMENT**



**Coalition Special Operations**  
**“The Netherlands Perspective”**





# INTRODUCTION

Koninklijke Landmacht



03 February 2005

NDIA SO-LIC Symposium



# MISSION KCT (1998)



- ✉ **Conduct missions in the NATO spectrum of Special Operations.**
- ✉ **Conduct missions in support of two military operations with up to 4 teams each (sustainability 3 years).**





# MISSION KCT

Koninklijke Landmacht



- ✉ **Provide service and administrative support and internal communications.**
- ✉ **Act as Policy and Planning branch for Special Operations, with a close link to the Defence Staff.**
- ✉ **Provide internal training for Special Operations.**



# TASKS KCT

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## Primary Mission Tasks

- ✉ **Special Reconnaissance (SR)**
- ✉ **Direct Action (DA)**
- ✉ **Military Assistance (MA)**

## Collateral Activities



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*... pre-selected high value targets ...*





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*.... small scale offensive actions ....*



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***... terminal guidance of precision-guided munitions ...***



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***... Provide training, advise or assistance to friendly or allied forces in peacetime, crisis or conflict ...***




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# ORGANIZATION

Koninklijke Landmacht







# ORGANIZATION

Koninklijke Landmacht





# INDIVIDUAL SKILLS

Koninklijke Landmacht



## SF Team 8 PAX



Sniper

Sniper

Medic

Medic

Comspec

Comspec

Demspec

Demspec



# JOINT OPERATIONS

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# FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

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- ✉ **Directives and co-ordination from SOF Branch of the CHOD.**
- ✉ **Integration with “Special Forces” of the Royal (NL) Marine Corps.**
- ✉ **Integration with “designated” Royal (NL) Air Force elements.**





# COMBINED OPERATIONS

Koninklijke Landmacht



## ✉ **BOSNIA / KOSOVO / FYROM**

- ▶ **Crisis Response Operations**
- ▶ **Joint Commision Observers**
- ▶ **PIFWC Operations (National Issue)**



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
# COMBINED OPERATIONS

Koninklijke Landmacht



## ✉ AFGHANISTAN

- ▶ Crisis Response Operations
- ▶ Military Assistance to ANA



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
# COMBINED OPERATIONS

Koninklijke Landmacht



## ✉ IRAQ

- ▶ National SF Operations in AOR
- ▶ Military Assistance to ICDC
- ▶ Field Liaison Teams (FLT)



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# COMBINED TRAINING

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## Emphasis at team level

- ▶ NATO exercises.
- ▶ Training with other SF units.

## Emphasis at unit level

- ▶ NATO Staff training & exercises.
- ▶ NATO & international courses.



# FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Koninklijke Landmacht



- ✉ **Increased level of ambition for joint operations!**
- ✉ **Employment in Coalition SOF operations (intent NL government)!**
- ✉ **Increase national and international interoperability!**
- ✉ **Form a (bi-national) framework for CJFSOCC operations by 2007!**



# CONCLUSION

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# United We Conquer

03 February 2005

NDIA SO-LIC Symposium

# ***Coalition SOF Support to the War on Terrorism (WOT)***



***Major General Gary L. Harrell***

***Combined Forces Special Operations Component Commander (CFSOCC)***

***United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)***

**This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED**



# Coalition Contributions to WOT

- Over 80 countries supporting Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF):
  - 64 countries have contributed conventional forces
  - 12 countries have contributed Coalition SOF (CSOF)
- In addition to providing forces, Coalition partners have made important contributions across the spectrum of operations:
  - Sharing intelligence
  - Providing liaison teams and supporting planning efforts
  - Providing materiel assistance
  - Providing basing, access, and over flight permission
  - Providing Humanitarian Assistance

Unity of Effort via Coalition operations is the  
key to strategic success in WOT



# Coalition SOF in WOT

- SOF from numerous Coalition partners are currently operating in the CENTCOM AOR.
- CSOF current mission sets:
  - Direct Action (DA)
  - Special reconnaissance (SR)
  - Unconventional warfare (UW)
  - Civil Affairs (CA)
  - PSYOPS
- Successes:
  - CSOF operations in their own Joint Special Operations Areas (JSOAs)
  - Seizure of GOPLATs; prevention of environmental crisis / securing Iraqi National resource
  - Integration of CSOF and conventional force operations
  - FID, CST





# *Improving / Sustaining Interoperability*

- **GOAL:** Assist countries within the CENTCOM AOR to develop an organic Special Operations and Counter-Terrorist capability to conduct successful CT operations within their borders
  - Work to develop Bi-Lateral SOF operations between Countries
  - Assist countries sub-regionally to develop bi-lateral and tri-lateral SOF operations (regional coalition operations)
- Combined Training and Exercises
  - Cornerstone of regional security
  - Develop and exercise command and control and communications
  - Venue to learn from past experiences and share successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for future deployments

Mutual trust and coalition interoperability  
equals success on the battlefield



# ***Achieving OIF/OEF Interoperability***

- General Preparation:
  - Use of CENTCOM Coalition Coordination Cell (CCC), Senior National Representatives, Defense Attaches
  - Predeployment /Interoperability Training
  - Communications Security Agreements (COMSEC MOA)
  - Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA)
  - Combined Training and Exercises
- Operational Considerations:
  - Linguists
  - Troop Rotations
  - Strategic movement
  - Medical Evacuation
- Employment is based on mission requirements, capability and desired effects



# *Strategic Lessons Learned*

---

- The enemy has access to and is using information technology
- Defeating terrorist organizations requires an international and inter-agency (civilian-military) approach
- World opinion can be shaped by the “soda straw” images portrayed on TV



# Conclusions

- CSOF are valuable contributions to GWOT, far in excess of their numbers
  - Tactical application of SOF to achieve strategic affects
- The Special Operations Community must develop a worldwide SOF standard in order to achieve interoperability
- Employment of CSOF requires detailed planning
- SOF Truths
  - Humans are more important than hardware
  - Quality is better than Quantity
  - Special Operations Forces cannot be massed produced
  - Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur




# UK CONCEPT FOR C2 OF OPERATIONS

## UK DELEGATION

- Colonel David HOPLEY  
Deputy Commander HQ UKSF
- Colonel David MADDAN  
Assistant Director Concepts – UK JDCC




# UK CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT







# MULTINATIONAL C2 – UK Participating





# ROLE OF NCC

**INFLUENCE**

- Shape the coalition based on personal relationships
- Advise, encourage and warn allies
- Apply rigour to planning based on Comnd & Staff input
- Watch Levels of risk

**SUPPORT**


- Approve the use of UK Forces (within delegated powers)
- Act as a figurehead
- Practice Mission Command
- Build contingent cohesion
- Provide log, CIS and other aspects of national responsibility

**INFORM**

- Ask for Military Strategic Support
- Report tactical incidents and operational developments
- Monitor and manage media interest



# ...NOTHING IS EVER SACRED!!





# MISSION TRAINING & PREPARATION SYSTEMs (MTPS)

(SOF Training Systems)

*From Monitorship to Leadership*

**Colonel Steve Howard, USAF**  
**United States Special Operations Command**  
**SOKF-J7-T**



# ***Are We On Data Overload?***

We must find better ways to filter, store, manage and make use of the massive amounts of geospatial data streaming in from a myriad of sources.





# Joint Challenge

- **No Enterprise Solution for *Management, Exploitation, and Dissemination* of geospatial data**
  - **Management** - Lack of space to store and manage the exponential growth of data
  - **Exploitation** - Size of derivative data products are much larger than source data
  - **Dissemination** - No rapid secure reliable delivery of geospatial data
- **Lack of Ability to Rapidly Build Geospatial Data Prior to Deployment**
  - Shortfall in awareness of source data and assets to build data
- **Lack of geospatial data interoperability between Component Commanders (COCOM), Modeling & Simulation, Joint Command and Control (JC2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) systems**
  - Inconsistent data formats and standardization




# ***Joint Impact***

- **Redundant Geospatial processing operations across DoD**
  - Duplicate costs fixing the same problems for the same data
- **Limited interoperability within DoD mission training, planning, preview, and rehearsal systems**
- **No common verification, validation, and accreditation of geospatial data**
  - Functionally restricts modeling and simulation, joint exercises, coalition partners, and operational mission planning




# Why Do We Keep Building the Same Data for the Same Locations?






# Where We're Going





# MTPS CONNECTIVITY

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED



# Questions?





# **CIVIL AFFAIRS**

## **In**

# **Afghanistan and Iraq**

## **2001-2003**

**Brigadier General**  
**Jack Kern**

**Presentation to NDIA 3 Feb 05**




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# Civil Affairs

## The Vital Coordination Link

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# **Civilian Expertise...with Military Skills**

## **CA Functional Specialties**

---

### **Government Team**

- **Public Administration**
- **Public Education**
- **Public Safety**
- **Public Health**
- **International Law**

### **Public Facilities Team**

- **Public Works / Utilities**
- **Public Communications**
- **Public Transportation**

### **Economics/Commerce Team**

- **Economic Development**
- **Civilian Supply**
- **Food and Agriculture**

### **Special Functions Team**

- **Dislocated Civilians**
- **Emergency Services**
- **Civil Information**
- **Cultural Affairs**
- **Environmental**

A person on a horse is silhouetted against a bright, hazy sky in the background. The foreground is a field of numerous small, bright yellow flowers. The overall scene is peaceful and rural.

# OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

## CIVIL AFFAIRS IN AFGHANISTAN



## Disposition of CJCMOTF and 489<sup>th</sup> CA Battalion 2002

**Det HQs**  
**UZ**

**CHLC**

**CHLC**

**Det HQs & CHLC**

**CHLC**


**CHLC**

**HQ CJCMOTF  
489<sup>th</sup> HQs &  
CHLC Kabul**

**CHLC**

**CHLC**

**CA with ---  
CENTCOM  
OSD & JCS  
ARCENT  
SOCCENT**



# CA Impact

by Nov 02

- **Airdrop 2.5M HDRs, 816 tons wheat, 73K blankets**
- **Minimized collateral damage to HA convoys and facilities during air campaign**
- **Opened airfields for civilians, UN & NGOs**
- **Info on security, lines of control, weather, airfield and road conditions to UN & NGOs**
- **CA projects --**
  - ✓ **75 schools -- 114,000 students**
  - ✓ **338 wells for 500,000 Afghans**
  - ✓ **18 medical facilities for 1.8m Afghans**
  - ✓ **300 km of irrigation canals rehabilitated**
  - ✓ **Employed 19,000 Afghans on CA projects**





# Civil Affairs in Iraq



# Civil Affairs Mission in Iraq

- Assist in establishing acceptable, stable new Iraqi government.
- Assist in recovery / reconstruction of essential life support and civilian infrastructure.
- Coordinate execution of HA projects in support of stabilization operations.
- Establish Humanitarian Ops Center
- On order, transition recovery operations lead.
- Troops Available --
  - CACOM HQ, 4 Brigades, 10 Battalions,
  - 2 USMC CAGs,
  - 1 FIF-CA Co



# **352 Functional Teams by Ministry**

## **Government Team**

- Justice
- Interior
- Higher Education
- Education
- Labor and Social Affairs
- Finance
- Foreign Affairs

## **Public Facilities Team**

- Transportation & Communications
- Housing and Construction
- Oil (USACE TF RIO is lead)
- Irrigation
- Public Works

## **Public Health Team (Provisional)**

- Health

## **Economics/Commerce Team**

- Planning
- Agriculture
- Industry and Minerals
- Central Standards
- Environment
- Trade (Public Distribution System)

## **Special Functions Team**

- Youth and Sports
  - Pro & Olympic Teams
  - Youth leagues
- Culture
  - ✓ Antiquities, museums
  - ✓ Tourism
  - ✓ Cinema and Theatre
  - ✓ National Library
  - ✓ Houses of Wisdom & Manuscripts
  - ✓ Music Institute -- Symphony



# CA Support to Iraq

- **Government – 25 ministries re-established**
- **88 Baghdad councils, 200 local councils nationwide**
- **Schools – back in session by June 03**
  - **22 Universities, 43 Tech Schools, 1500 buildings refurbished**
  - **Baathist propaganda gone from new texts**
- **Health – hospitals and clinics open**
  - **Nursing as a profession started**
  - **Children's vaccinations**
- **Infrastructure – clean water, Rail Road, Open port, Oil**
- **Legal – courts open, Legal Gazette published**
- **Police initially trained and functioning**
- **Finance – single, stable currency, banks open**
  - **CERP funds – recovered stolen money**
- **News – 200 independent news papers, satellite TV**
- **Telephones – 75% pre-war capability plus cellular system**

---

# Recommendations

---

- **Strategic level CA offices**
  - **Cmbtnt Cmds / HQDA / JCS / OSD**
- **Civil Common Operating Picture**
  - **Info Mgmt network**
- **Mobilization improvements**
- **Weapons, commo, armored vehicles**

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# Civil Affairs

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**BG John H. Kern, USAR**

**john.kern@us.army.mil**

**703-338-9328**





# Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations In Current and Future Conflicts

February 3, 2005


# Here we go again...

- After 13 years, I'm done.....

# Planning 1990

## WWII/National Survival


### Battlespace Box



————— **TIME** —————→

# Super-Power Planning 2003


## Battlespace Box



# Hyper-Power Planning


————— TIME —————→

**Battlespace Box**




# THIS is the revolution in military affairs.....

Plan this first.



● - good guys

Plan this second.



● - bad guys



# The 82d Airborne Sergeant at the Soccer Game...

“The Special Forces wanted to hug the enemy, we just wanted to kill them.”

“Son, you have to do both.....”

# Multiple Choice... Choose a or b.

a: Prevention

b: Preemption

*Info, speed, lethality, knowledge.... One better stay ahead...*


# Get ready for Info Wars...

**Regional?**

**Nope, its GLOBAL!**



COIN



**HUMAN  
TERRAIN  
Is KEY  
TERRAIN!**

Are we winning or losing?  
 Hamas?  
 Taliban?

# What are cooperative arrangements for...


- Shape
- Deceive
- Project
- Find
- Capture
- Share
- Convince
- Change

**It ain't us again' them  
no more...**

**It's all of us against them.**

# INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE CA/PSYOP?

## Cultural awareness...



Doctrinally & experientially, we tossed it....

- Tier I: US Army Special Forces—Security Assistance, FID, IDAD plus CA and PSYOP  
**(Nixon Doctrine – Nations defend themselves)**

**Note: Basilan Island/Afghanistan in OEF/EL  
Salvador Model/Vietnam “Red Hats” in Iraq**

- Tier II: US Army Separate Brigades- fight the heavy fight to allow host nation forces to develop.
- Tier III: US Army General Purpose Forces from CONUS become the main effort until the enemy is reduced in power and handover to the host nation is possible.



# We need to forgive the Cold Warriors...

- The enemy is over there and we are over here.
- Raids are the answer.
- Platforms not people.
- Nodal/Operational Net targeting is enough.
- National survival = winning, not entering the enemy territory and forcing change.
- The Greatest Generation were the last occupiers.
- War is against things, not men.
- Technology is the answer.
- **When a nation hasn't won a major war for over 50 years, lessons atrophy.**


**DOD wasn't watching the battle lab in Latin America, only the failure in Vietnam .....**

# We need to forgive reflexive reaction...


- JTF's according to joint doctrine.
- Steam the fleet.
- Rapid Deployment Operations template.

# Building Up and Down....

## Haiti, Panama, Afghanistan?



# Wins can come at any time...



# Post Vietnam

- DOD returned to its roots. Major Combat Operations against the Soviets... and rebuilt from the great debacle's nadir of professionalism.
- DOD also through out the baby with the bathwater.
  - Counter-insurgency
  - Special Forces
  - Unconventional Warfare
  - Psychological Operations
  - Civil Affairs
  - Cognizance of Culture & Indirect Warfare

# How do we win the War on Terrorism?

- With Intelligence.
  - Provided by US and Global resources of allies, coalition members and friends **and enemies**.
  - Cooperation on interrogation, capture, kill and prosecution.


- With Wisdom.

Others with common interest win this war for us – In Afghanistan and elsewhere. This conflict is too big/complex for the US to go it alone – and there it will be impossible for us to effectively attack the ideology of radical Islam – Thomas Friedman has it right:

*Muslims MUST police themselves.*




# The Art Form...





# The Art Form...

**The US owns neither  
all of the carrots nor all  
of the sticks!**

carrot




stick




The right balance!


# Basic Schematic...



# Basic Schematic...




SOF: DA,SR,UW,WMD, **CA**,  
**PSYOP**, INFLUENCE, etc.



**Conflict is bigger than war, winning is more important than victory.**

# USSOCOM:

“When ones encounters a fork in the road, take it...”



**The nation needs all three....**



# A transition worth watching...

- Will SOF embrace the value of forward presence and shaping?
- Is demassification and hyper-specialization understood & will roles and missions correspond?
- Is SOF to win wars (El Salvador Model) or do less?
- If the charter for Paramilitary Ops comes SOF's way, is SOF ready for structural overhaul?
- Will SOF take the opportunity to create a new life form for the nation or will it do incremental change and add-ons to current constructs?

**Will SOF address the *BILLIONS*?**

**Future of SF/CA/PSYOP?**

# “When the GWOT is over...

...if SOF looks like it did going in, something is wrong.”\*

**SOF, CA and PSYOP** --- historic opportunity.

**\*LTG – NDIA SOLIC 2004**

**JOINT  
RAID  
FOCUS**

The diagram consists of a small purple circle on the left containing the text 'JOINT RAID FOCUS'. A black arrow points from this circle to a large yellow oval on the right. Inside the yellow oval is the text 'GLOBAL, COOPERATIVE, MULTI-FUNCTIONAL, MULTI-DIMENSIONAL WINNING'. Below the purple circle is the text '1980-on'.

**1980-on**

**GLOBAL, COOPERATIVE,  
MULTI-FUNCTIONAL,  
MULTI-DIMENSIONAL  
WINNING**

# Contractors in Worldwide Coalition Warfare


3 February, 2005





# MTC Corporate Summary

- A twenty year old defense services provider focused on technical systems integration and end to end solutions contributing to coalition operations.
- Focused on U.S. defense mission with emphasis on:
  - Systems Engineering Solutions
  - Information/Training Technology
  - Intelligence Operations/Support
  - Program Management
- Over 2500 employees providing contributing across the spectrum of operations.
- Engaged in deploying, redeploying and resetting AC/NG/RC forces





# MTC Wartime Initiatives

- Reset and Restructure of 3d Mech, 82<sup>nd</sup>, and 101st Divisions.
- Preparation of 1st Infantry Division (Europe)
- Support of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams in Iraq
- Reconstitution of 1st Armored Division (Europe)
- Preparation of 2<sup>nd</sup> ID, USFK



# The Nature of Coalition Operations

- The Definition: Combination/alliance/confederacy....or the gathering of a multi-national force that increases strength, political resolve, and decreases risk and cost of the lead coalition member.
- The Setting: Our forces need to be at the tip of the spear, while our talented and experienced contractor team members provide seasoned, competent and committed support to coalition operations.



# Contractors are Part of the team

- Personal and professional commitment to the war on terrorism.
- Required skills, talents and experience
- Customer focused across the spectrum
- Selflessness in supporting the customer
- Corporate responsibility
  - Properly trained and capable team members
  - Compliant with CFLCC policies in the combat zone
  - Liability and hazard duty coverage
  - Reward for risk
  - Family care during deployment
  - Mission awareness and team relationship



# Cycle of Operations





# The Events

- Pre-Deployment/Deployment
  - Contractors involved in early planning/and training
  - Transportation scheduling and equipment fielding (RFI)
  - Supply/Maintenance management
  - Equipment readiness
  - Base operations support (personnel, finance, legal, etc)
  - Embedded deployment and reach-back
  - Caretaking stay behind property and equipment
- Combat Operations
  - Capture OPTEMPO, BMAR, upgrade and maintenance history.
  - Responsive lines of communications and support
  - Logistics services (maintenance, supply, fuel, rations, transportation)
  - Communications and automation support
  - Preposition stocks management



# The Events

- Redeployment
  - Contractors involved in early planning for movement and reconstitution
  - Transportation scheduling and maintenance support
  - Inspection and disposition
  - OPTEMPO data collection
  - Planning for time, resources, and tasks upon return
  - Integrate and synchronize tasks
    - Reset, Recap, tech insertion, and obsolescence management
    - On site, depot, redistribution or salvage
- Reconstitution/Reset/Synchronization
  - Receipt and Inspection
  - Maintenance, service and tech insertion
  - Supply management and data collection
  - CARC painting
  - Storage and subsequent COSIS
  - Management of excess equipment
  - Disposition and shipping



# Some Thoughts

- Habitual and continuous relationships are important
- Contractors can and should be embedded in the organization
- Contractors can maintain focus on specific critical tasks and ease commanders' resource management constraints
- Contractors are often more efficient and less costly than the military, when task specific
- Contractors provide continuity as military are reassigned from job to job



# Business Operations in Hostile Environments

*Securing Your People and Business Assets*

Thursday, 3 February, 2005

NDIA SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition



# Who We Are

- Global Security, Logistics & Training Firm
- Our Team
  - Former SAS, other military, paramedics
- Regional Offices
  - London (Headquarters)
  - Washington, DC
  - Baghdad
  - Kabul
  - Islamabad
  - Moscow








# Why We are Different

- High End Quality Service (not mass market)
- Dedicated Training Establishment
- Intelligent Approach (client focused, low profile, subtle techniques – negotiating techniques)

# What We Do





- Aligned with British Government & MoD
- British Defence Export Services Registered
- ISO 9000 2001 Standards
- Corporate, Media, Military, Police
- Regular Courses – media industry benchmark
- Dedicated Training Venues
  - US Virginia
  - UK
- Trained in 26 Countries 2004



## Corporate Courses

- Hostile Environment Awareness Training
- First Aid
- Driving Skills


\*\*Courses tailored to meet client needs.





# Training

TOR<sub>international</sub>



intelligence | discretion | protection



# Security Projects

- Operational Support
  - Security Assessments
  - Information Gathering
  - Liaison @ civil, military
  - Standard & Emergency Procedures
  - Protection of People and Assets
  - Training Program of Nationals





# Security Projects

- Operational Support
  - Security Assessments
  - Information Gathering
  - Liaison @ civil, military
  - Standard & Emergency Procedures
  - Protection of People and Assets
  - Training Programme of Nationals
- Logistics
  - 400 tons to Iraq in 2004





# Security Projects

- Operational Support
  - Security Assessments
  - Information Gathering
  - Liaison @ civil, military
  - Standard & Emergency Procedures
  - Protection of People and Assets
  - Training Programme of Nationals
- Logistics
  - 400 tons to Iraq in 2004
- Ports & Borders Security
  - Assessments, Planning, Implementation, Monitoring & evaluation
  - Maritime
  - Sea Ports
  - Airports
  - Border Control & Integrity (Integrated Solutions)





# Equipment Procurement

- Body Armour, Helmets, Comms
- Medical Kit
- Vehicles
- Weapons & Ammunition (for US military – Iraqi Security Forces)



# Case Study

- Client "X" background
  - Baghdad
  - USG contractor
  - No pre-deployment security plan
  - Compound Red Zone, Beside Police HQ
  - Concern after UN bombing Aug '03







# Case Study

- TOR Immediate Response
  - 12 hours – Consultant on site
  - 24 hours - Deployed CPD
  - Established perimeter





# Case Study

- TOR Response
  - 24 hours
  - Deployed CPD
  - Establish perimeter
  - Established SOPs
  - Daily Information Update
  - Hired IN guard force
  - Vehicles, Med Kit, Body Armour, Comms
  - Changed Location (Facilities Management)
  - Training







# Hostile Environment Training

## Custom 5 Day Course Designed:

- Cultural Awareness
- Body Language
- Negotiating Skills
- Ballistic & Mine Awareness
- Navigation & Track 24
- Emergency Medical Care
- Convoy Procedures
- Checkpoint Procedures
- Emergency Drills (ambush, veh down, casualties...)
- Kidnap
- Post Traumatic Stress Disorder











# Contact Us

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# Addressing The Political Warfare Challenge

The Requirement to  
Transform to Meet the New  
Threat

# Contents


- I. The Global Environment
- II. The Challenge
- III. The Search for a Solution
- IV. Current/Defacto Policy
- V. Future Trends

# The Global Environment

## The Cold War Paradigm



## Today



# New World Order

- New Blocs forming along PIME
  - Political
  - Information/Culture
  - Military
  - Economic
- New versus Old Europe
- Emergence of Islamic World
- Opponents of Globalism



# Global Demographics

- Over 50% of the population of the emerging world is under 20 years of age
  - Includes all of Islamic World
  - Is in contrast to the developed world which is experiencing aging population
- Emerging world does not remember Cold War and has no sense of debt to US
- Communist era propaganda is alive and well

# Affordable Mass Niche Communications

- Advent of affordable mass niche communications has changed how we communicate
  - Internet
  - Cellular Technology
  - Satellite Broadcast
- Emerging world never invested in landlines, literacy or modern ethical journalism
  - Use the new technology differently than west does
  - Rumint is truth in emerging world
  - Emerging world is more proficient in use of technology

# The Challenge

- “There is nothing new under the sun.”  
Ecclesiastes
- Because the threat can not compete militarily or economically, the threat has instead focused on Political and Information Warfare
- Threat is following established historical pattern of an insurgency (e.g. Maoist Revolutionary Doctrine)

# Maoist Revolutionary Doctrine

- Phase I Create Ideology/ Build Revolutionary Core
- Phase II Use Terrorist Tactics to destabilize the environment and polarize the debate
- Phase III Conduct insurgency warfare and establish shadow governance structures
- Phase IV Engage in open conventional warfare
- Phase V Consolidate victory and expand the revolution

# Insurgency Pyramid



**Ideology is the cornerstone of threat activity. Until the ideology is discredited, the threat will continue to regenerate. The ideology will not burn itself out and requires active measures to be discredited.**




# The Current Threat: Radical Militant Islamic

“Islam wants the whole Earth and does not content itself with only a part of it. It wants and requires the entire inhabited world....

It will spare no effort to achieve this supreme objective.


This far-reaching struggle that continuously exhausts all forces, and this employment of all possible means are called: Jihad.”

Abul A'la Mawdudi, 1954



*Jihad is a critical component of the Radical Islamic ideology*

# The Islamic World





# The Making of A Militant

## From cradle to grave



"And always remind him that we must become strong so that we can defeat the enemies of Allah."

Muslim Character,  
Courage and the child



"I sensed a warm feeling engulfing my being; it's as if my heart beat was saying: Allah, please make me a martyr."

*Reem Riyyashi, female  
suicide bomber. Jan. 2004*



"The time has come to kill Americans in their homeland."

*Ahmad Haznaoui al-Ghamedi. 9/11  
hijacker.*

# Perception of Victory

Islam takes no half-measures in dealing with Jahiliyya .... It is either Islam or Jahiliyya. Islam does not accept or agree to a condition which is half-Islam and half-Jahiliyya.

Islam's position [on this matter] is clear: God's uniqueness is absolute, and anything outside this God is perdition. There is no room for ambiguity or nuance."

Sayyed Qutb. Milestones. 1964

Victory for Militant Radical Islam is when infidel regimes in Muslim countries are overthrown and replaced by a Caliphate that will implement Shari'a.

# Militant Radical Islamic Groups

Al-Qaeda	Saudi Arabia
Al-Takfir wa Al-Hijra	Egypt
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Pakistan
Islamic Jihad	Egypt and Palestine
Salafist Group for Call and Combat	Algeria
Asbat Al-Ansar	Lebanon
The Young Believers	Yemen
Abu-Sayyaf Group	Philippines
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	Central Asia
Jaysh Al-Mahdi	Iraq



# Other Emerging Competitor Blocs

- Neo Maoism (P,I,M,E)
- Neo Liberalism (P,I,E)
- Axis of Evil (P,M)

# How Did the USG Become Vulnerable

- 40 years of ossification followed by sudden change
- Cold War Policy/ Organization NSC-47
  - P- Containment/ The United Nations
  - I- “Freeworld”/ USIA
  - M- Mutual Defense Treaties/ NATO, SEATO, etc
  - E- “Free Trade”/ Marshall Plan, IMF, World Bank
- Current Policy/ Organization is lacking

# The Threat has Information Supremacy

- USIA dismantled and no successor agency formed
- PSYOP underfunded and discredited for past 10 years
- Strategic Communication is marginalized within Government
  - DoS
  - DoD
  - NSC

# The Challenge Summarized

- The threat has a 2 to 3 year lead on the USG
- No USG Information Policy exists
- No USG advocate organization
- Little resident capability remains from Cold War
- Threat is not going away and leaving Iraq will not end threat

# Lanes in the Road

- Public Affairs, Psychological Operations and Public Diplomacy are related for distinct capabilities
- Synchronization of Effort will occur at senior levels of responsibility
- Policy makers will make policy, planners plan and operators execute



# Future Trends

- Execution requires application of time honored tactics
- IO is a service capability / not a special capability
- USG will designate a proponent organization
- Transformation is ongoing

# Process

- Focus Group Research
- Develop Objectives, Strategy, Themes/Programs and Metrics
- Produce Products, Build Conduits and Market Test
- Execute Campaign
- Adjust Themes as required based on metrics

# Transformation

- Mission/ Policy
- Technology
- Organization
- Personnel/Training

# Challenges

- Target Audience Analysis
- Dissemination
- Metrics







# **Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)**

*Education...A Strategic Imperative  
for the War on Terrorism*

Scott W. Moore  
Director Academics, CTFP  
Joint Special Operations University



# Program's Purpose

- **Educate foreign military and civilians who are directly involved in the war on terrorism**
  - **Our Students: 1) “CT” (Civilians & Military) Practitioners, 2) Strategists & Policymakers, 3) *The public***
- **Create and maintain a human CT network with shared values and a common language**
- **Provide countries with the intellectual means to create, sustain and grow CT capabilities & capacities**
  - **Two-way street; glean strategic, operational insights from others**
- **Influence countries to cooperate more fully in U.S. and coalition efforts to combat terrorism**

***SOF participation is critical to program's success and relevancy***

# National Strategy for the GWOT

## Ends

**Strategic Goal:** *Preserve the freedom and openness of our society and that of other nations by creating an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.*

**Strategic Intent:** *Our strategy is to help create and lead a broad international effort to deny enemy networks what they require to operate and survive.*

## Ways

**Protect the  
Homeland,  
our allies,  
and interests**

**Disrupt  
and Attack  
terrorist  
networks**

**Counter  
ideological  
support for  
terrorism**

## Means

Instruments of National  
Power

Diplomatic

Intelligence

Military

Economic

Financial

Information

Law Enforcement

USG Strategic Elements

# National Military Strategic Framework

## Ends

***Strategic Goal: Preserve the freedom and openness of our society and that of other nations by creating an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.***

**Protect the  
Homeland, Allies,  
and Interests**

**Disrupt and  
Attack  
Terrorist  
Networks**

**Counter  
Ideological  
Support for  
Terrorism**

## Military Strategic Objectives

***Establish conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.***

***Defeat terrorists and their organizations.***

***Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive.***

*(resources: leadership, foot soldiers, safe havens, weapons, funds, comms and movement, access to targets, and ideological support)*

***Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.***

***Dissuade, coerce, and when necessary, compel states and non-states to cease support for terrorists.***

***Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence mgmt.***

**Combatant  
Commands**


**Services**

**Combat Support  
Agencies**

## Ways

## Means

# Strategic (course) Logic







# Accomplishments

- **New ground broken ... DoD can now selectively assist non-US security and law enforcement officials**
- **Over 1,000 individuals educated & trained in partner nations annually**
- **Funding through 2009**
- **Requests exceed current capacity**
- **Educational consortium established**
- **New programs, courses & classes are offered at a wide variety of institutions**
- **Key program graduates participate in the consortium as colleagues**



# Sample Offerings

- **Mobile Education Teams**
  - **Malta, Chad, Hawaii, Romania, Malaysia, Cambodia, India, Paraguay, etc.**
- **Faculty Exchange**
  - **Colombian War College**
- **Resident Courses**
  - **From Master's Degree programs to specialized courses**
  - **From University settings & Regional Centers to Service Schools**
- **Seminars**
- **Consortium Events**




# Why Does This Make So Much Sense for JSOU?

- **USSOCOM's lead role in the global WOT**
- **JSOU provides strategic conduit between SOF and high policymakers**
- **Educational outreach provides JSOU with a unique and broad perspective**
- **Academic freedom permits fresh, unconstrained perspectives**
- **No other institution gathers and applies insights from foreign students as a global or transregional collective**
- **These strategic insights will benefit SOCOM in its WOT activities**



# Learning Domains





# Impact

- **A DoD authority to provide education and training**
- **Pushing the envelope for international CT training**
  - **New programs, new approaches**
  - **Ancillary benefits to US schools and participants**
- **Lashing together the “policy” and “practice”**
- **Opening doors to previously denied areas**
- **Fostering regional approaches to combating terrorism**
- **Beginning to build trust & “CT” fellowship**

***Education – A Strategic Imperative for the War on Terrorism!***





# Contacts

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## • **JSOU**

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- Scott.Moore2@hurlburt.af.mil (850) 884-3955

CT Fellowship Website - DISAM's International Training Management page:

[http://disam.osd.mil/intl\\_training/Programs/CTF/@CTF\\_Program.htm](http://disam.osd.mil/intl_training/Programs/CTF/@CTF_Program.htm)

**CT Fellowship Website**

[www.ctfellowship.org](http://www.ctfellowship.org)



# Backups



# ***Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM)***

## ***ASD/SOLIC-NDIA SOF Symposium***

***CAPT David Morrison, USN  
Commander, SOCJFCOM***

# *USJFCOM's Mission Set*


- Multi-National Information Sharing (MNIS)
- Joint Systems Integration Command (JSIC)

## **Joint Interoperability**

- Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC)
- SOCJFCOM
- Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)

- Joint Stability Operations
- Major Combat Operations

## **Joint Concept Development and Experimentation**



## **Joint Force Provider**


- FLTFORCMD
- MARFORLANT
- FORSCOM
- ACC

## **Joint Force Trainer**




# ***SOCJFCOM Mission***

***Train conventional and special operations joint force commanders and their staffs in the employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) focusing on the full integration of SOF and conventional forces in both planning and execution to enhance warfighting readiness.***




***USJFCOM Mission Areas***

# Theater SOCs vs. SOCJFCOM




# SOF Joint Training




Self-paced Education

# Joint Training







# Training Support Requirements





And . . . emerging training support requirements, Capstone, JSOU ISOC, Army War College, WIC training, etc.



# Training Products



- Feedback to units, the field
- Input to transformation, training, & doctrine
- Institutionalizing best practices



Tools

Training Handbooks

Lessons Learned Briefings

Lessons Learned Reports

Input to Joint Doctrine

SOPs & Master Tng Guide

Seminars

AIRBORNE



UNCLASSIFIED

# Insights & Lessons Learned

Long-term


Mid-term

Short-term


Immediate




Operations & Exercise Lessons



Collective "Insights" & Revised Training Seminars



New or Revised Techniques & Procedures "Handbooks"



New or Revised "Joint Doctrine & TTP"

## ***FY 04 Training Support***



# Summary

*Focused on increasing effectiveness  
of SOF in the joint, multinational,  
and interagency environment*



**Supporting USJFCOM's priorities:**

- Global War on Terrorism
- Integration



# **The Future of Coalition Warfare**

**NDIA SOLIC Symposium  
February 4, 2005**

**Tom O'Connell**

**Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict**





# **National Defense Strategy of the United States of America**



# Strategic Objectives

- **Secure the United States from direct attack** – dissuade, deter and defeat those who seek to harm the U.S. directly.
- **Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action** - promote the security, prosperity, and freedom of action of the U.S. and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication and the global commons.
- **Strengthen alliances and partnerships** - expand the community of like-minded nations and help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.
- **Establish favorable security conditions** – create conditions conducive to a favorable international system by honoring security commitments and working with others to bring about a common appreciation of threats; a broad, secure, and lasting peace; and the steps required to protect against these threats.



# Challenges

The U.S. military predominates in the world in ***traditional*** forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the U.S. through ***traditional*** military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods. An array of ***traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive*** capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests:



# Maturing and Emerging Challenges

- ***Traditional*** challenges are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.
- ***Irregular*** challenges come from those employing unconventional methods to counter the ***traditional*** advantages of stronger opponents.
- ***Catastrophic*** challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.
- ***Disruptive*** challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.



# Four Approaches to Accomplishing our Objectives

- Assure allies and friends
- Dissuade potential adversaries
- Deter aggression and Counter coercion
- Defeat adversaries





# Defeat Adversaries

The U.S. will lead a broad international effort to deny terrorist networks what they require to operate and survive:

- Ideological support-key to recruitment and indoctrination
- Communications and movement-including access to information and intelligence; ability to travel and attend meetings; and command and control
- Safe havens-ability to train, plan, and operate without disruption
- Weapons, including WMD
- Funds
- Access to targets-the ability to plan and reach targets at home or abroad
- Leadership
- Foot soldiers



# Unified Command Plan 2004



# USSOCOM

**CDRUSSOCOM - commander of a combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander's missions. USSOCOM has no geographic AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. In addition to functions specified in sections 164(c) and 167 of title 10, USSOCOM's responsibilities include:**

- A. Providing combat-ready operations forces to other combatant commands when and as directed.**
- B. Training, to include joint training exercises, of assigned forces and developing appropriate recommendations to the Chairman regarding strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the joint employment of special operations forces.**



# Responsibilities (cont):

- C. Integrating and coordinating DOD psychological operations (PSYOP) capabilities to enhance interoperability and support USSTRATCOM's information operations responsibilities and other combatant commanders' PSYOP planning and execution.**
- D. Exercising command and control of selected special operations missions, as directed.**
- E. Serving as the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders. CDRUSSOCOM leads a global collaborative planning process leveraging other combatant command capabilities and expertise that results in decentralized execution by both USSOCOM and other combatant commands against terrorist networks. In this role, USSOCOM's specific responsibilities:**



# Responsibilities Cont:

1. Integrating DOD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities, and operations against terrorist networks designated by the terrorists designated by the Secretary.
2. Planning campaigns against designated terrorist networks.
3. Prioritizing and synchronizing theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns against designated terrorist networks in coordination with the geographic combatant commanders.
4. Exercising command and control of operations in support of selected commands, as directed.
5. Providing military representation to U.S. national and international agencies for matters related to U.S. and multinational campaigns against designated terrorist networks as directed by the Secretary.
6. Planning operational preparation of the environment (OPE); executing OPE or synchronizing the execution of OPE in coordination with the geographic combatant commanders.





# USSOCOM Responsibilities

## Title 10 (Sec167)

1. Develop Strategy, Doctrine & Tactics
2. Train assigned forces
3. Conduct specialized courses of instruction for officers and NCOs
4. Validate and establish priorities for requirements
5. Ensure the interoperability of equipment and forces
6. Ensure combat readiness of forces assigned to USSOCOM
7. Monitor the preparedness of special operations to carry out assigned missions of SOF assigned to unified COCOMS other than USSOCOM
8. Formulate and submit requirements for intelligence support.
9. Prepare and submit to SECDEF program recommendations and budget proposals for Special Operations and other forces assigned to USSOCOM
10. Exercise authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for forces assigned to USSOCOM and for SOF assigned to unified COCOMs other than USSOCOM
11. Prioritize requirements
12. Ensure interoperability of equipment
13. Monitor the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military development of all SOF officers
14. Internally audit and inspect purchase and contract actions
15. Develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment
16. Acquire special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services



National Defense University

Institute for National Strategic Studies

# **Apocalyptic Terrorism:**

## **The Case for Preventive Action**

**by Joseph McMillan**

**The U.S. needs to articulate a strong case for the right of anti-terrorist intervention based on three concepts adapted from international law:**

- **The classification of terrorists as the common enemy of humankind**
- **A renewed emphasis on sovereign responsibility as the corollary of sovereign rights**
- **Application of the logic of the inherent right of self-defense to the realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century**



# Section 1208 Authorities



The SecDef “may expend up to \$25 Million during any fiscal year during which this subsection is in effect to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by U.S. Special Operation Forces to combat terrorism.”



# Coalition Operations

## Cold War

- Specific set of enemies with incompatible ideologies
- Clear and unambiguous challenge
- Regional alliances, formal and inflexible

## GWOT

- Elusive and dangerous enemies, they come and go
- Less formal and ambiguous challenges
- Coalition of the willing, flexible



# Coalition Warfare

## Australian View

- Shared Interests/objectives are vital
- Critical nature of constant communication, consultation and coordination throughout mission
- Key importance of interoperability
- Appropriate command and control arrangements
- Shared rules of engagement
- Expectations management
- Niche capabilities
- Trade-offs





# Closing Thoughts on Coalitions

- We face an enemy without a country – seeks no armistice
- Their weapons are terror and chaos
- They are convinced they can win the battle of perceptions
- 90 countries can be numbered in our coalition (to some degree)

**“TEST OF WILLS” VS. “BATTLE OF IDEAS”**



# WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS

- New Execute Orders will synchronize coalition operations
- SEALs/Polish GROM – Iraq
- Integrating CN strategy with coalition partners
- 9-11 Commission on PM activities
- Building Foreign Capacity

**GEN Tom Hill's farewell letter**  
**Rise of Gangs**  
**New training authorities**



# Stability Operations

**Dr. Jeffrey “Jeb” Nadaner**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations**



# OSD SO/LIC Stability Operations

- To win the GWOT, the USG has to foster DoD, interagency and international capabilities to conduct successful stabilization and reconstruction missions and close safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks.
- DoD capabilities:
  - *OSD SO/LIC Stability Operations is working on a DoD directive that seeks to:*
    - Place stability operations on a comparable footing as combat operations.
    - Incorporate them in all planning phases.
    - Develop relevant exercises and training.
    - Develop broader interagency and international involvement.



# OSD SO/LIC Stability Operations (Cont.)

- **USG capabilities:**
  - *Support the State Department's Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS)*
  - *Assess whether a U.S. civilian reserve is needed to assist in stability operations*
- **International capabilities:**
  - *Peacekeeping — Global Peace Operations Initiative*
  - *Building partner nation security capacity*



# Contractors On Your Battlefield?

Craig Peterson

Vice President  
KBR Contingency & Homeland Operations

**Kellogg Brown & Root Proprietary Data**

**NOTE:** This document contains information which may be withheld from the public because disclosure would cause a foreseeable harm to an interest protected by one or more Exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC Section 552. Furthermore, it is requested that any Government entity receiving this information act **in accordance with DoD 5400.7-R**, and consider this information as being **for official use only (FOUO)**, and mark, handle and store this information so as to prevent unauthorized access.

# KBR Government and Infrastructure

## *A Global Presence...Trained and Ready*

Over 29,000 Employees  
Over 30,000 Subcontractors  
34 Countries

60 Fatalities  
239 Wounded

...No Mission Failure  
...No Work Stoppage  
...Support Remains Outstanding




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# KBR

# Use of Service Contractors in Contingencies



- 40% Reduction in Force Structure
- 300% Increase in OPTEMPO

## KBR Contingency Experience

▪ SOMALIA	USMC & 10TH MTN DIV
▪ RWANDA	UNITED NATIONS
▪ SAUDI ARABIA	XVIII ABN CORPS
▪ KUWAIT	24TH INF DIV
▪ HAITI	10TH MTN DIV
▪ HUNGARY	TF EAGLE / NATO
▪ BOSNIA	TF EAGLE / NATO
▪ CROATIA	TF EAGLE/NATO
▪ SLOVENIA (SPOD)	TF EAGLE/NATO
▪ ITALY	V CORPS / TF HAWK
▪ ALBANIA	USAREUR / V CORPS
▪ KOSOVO	TF FALCON
▪ MACEDONIA	TF FALCON
▪ GREECE	TF FALCON
▪ BULGARIA	USAREUR
▪ ROMANIA	USAREUR
▪ CUBA	GTMO DET. FAC.
▪ GUAM	U.S. NAVY
▪ UZBEKISTAN	10TH MTN DIV
▪ AFGHANISTAN	101ST & 82ND ABN DIV
▪ REP of GEORGIA	SOF / MARFOR EUR
▪ KUWAIT	ARCENT/CENTCOM
▪ DJIBOUTI	USMC
▪ JORDAN	SOF
▪ TURKEY	USAREUR
▪ IRAQ	CENTCOM / CPA

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**KBR**

# Capability and Involvement...24/7 & 12

## *Planning and Training Support*

### Planning Support

- 32 Existing Plans For Combatant Commanders
- CASCOM
- I Corps

### Pre-deployment Briefings

- 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division
- XVIII Airborne Corps
- II Marine Expeditionary Force



### Mock Forward Operating Bases

#### Role Players

ANG Mission Readiness Exercise  
Ft Hood

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**KBR**



# Capability and Involvement...24/7 & 12

## Strategic Enablers

### Deployment Centers

- Fort Belvoir
- Houston

### Rail Operations

- Bosnia
- Kosovo
- Iraq

### Sea Port Operations

- Croatia
- Romania
- Bulgaria
- Greece
- Kuwait

### Aerial Port Operations

- Bosnia
- Kosovo
- Kuwait
- Iraq
- Djibouti

### Forward Deployed Strategic Platforms

- Djibouti
- Uzbekistan

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**KBR**



# Capability and Involvement...24/7 & 12

## Force Employment

### The Balkans

- Bosnia
- Kosovo

### Republic of Georgia

- Train & Equip

### Afghanistan

- Bagram
- Kabul
- Kandahar
- FOBs

### Iraq

- RIO / PCO Oil
- USMI
- III Corps
- Iraq Survey Group
- Coalition Forces
- Logistics Mgmt Ctr
- COE CENTCOM

### Kuwait

### Djibouti

Troop Support  
Engineering and Construction  
Facilities Operations and Maintenance  
Logistics  
Recovery & Retrograde


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**KBR**

# Supported Troop List

Virtually every military member in the Theater is supported by KBR




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
**KBR**

# Making Contractors a Part of the Force

- **Doctrine and Training**
  - Programs of Instruction
  - Mission Training Plans
  - Mission Readiness Exercises
  - Contingency Relevant FAR
  - Staff functions/expertise
- **Force Employment**
  - Pre-deployment Briefings from Support Contractor
  - Embedded Planners
  - Inclusion in HN Agreements
  - Investment in Initial Entry Packages
- **Synchronize business, financial and operations cycles**
- **Standardize to flex Homeland Incident Response**
- **PEO/JPO Services**



# Joint Future



Kellogg Brown & Root Proprietary Data

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**KBR**







# TG ARES - Figures

209 men :


Senior Officers	7 %	Officers : 19 %
Junior Officers	12 %	
Senior NCOs	20 %	NCO's : 53
Junior NCOs	33 %	
PVTS	28 %	PVTs : 28 %

Average age : 32 years old  
Average Duty time : 12 years  
Army : 66 %    Navy : 17 %    Air Force : 17 %    Joint

Previous operations :

Congo – Ex-Yugoslavia – Kosovo – Albania – Afghanistan – Côte d'Ivoire – Djibouti – Lebanon – Iraq I – Republic of Central Africa – Rwanda – Chad – Somalia

# TG ARES - Structure



# Lessons learned from History

- **Chinese guerilla rules**
  - > the main effort should go to HUMINT to understand, fight and finally eradicate ENY covert activities
- **French counter guerilla methodology in Algeria**
  - > Political and military actions should be tightly combined
  - > Keep a close link with the populace
  - > Intelligence is of prime importance
  - > OPSEC is vital to survive
- **Spetsnatz in Afghanistan**
  - > Discrimination between locals remains the major concern
  - > SOF should get acquainted with locals

# DECISIONS

- **Perform according to guerilla warfare rules**
  - work in an area, live in another next to it
  - give priority to Intelligence
  - do your best to UNDERSTAND the people
  - be everywhere, at all times
- **Give priority to countering guerilla goals rather than fighting guerilla warriors**
  - all SOF should develop a comprehensive insight of the situation
  - all officers should take care of keeping the balances at a local and / or regional scale not to let the guerilla work on any imbalance

# COAs in AO Arès (1/2)

- **"Nomadisation" IOT**
  - Know the area (landscapes, people, ... )
  - gather intelligence (through what you see, hear, feel)
  - know the background noise
  - produce background noise  
(be seen everywhere, often but not for long, meet officials)
  - "forget" OP's
- **Cordon and search**
- **Actions of opportunity**
  - upon conjunction
  - according to intelligence




# COAs in AO Arès (2/2)

- **Develop networks**
  - Friends
  - Agents
- **Deploy mobile FOBs**
  - in remote places
  - for long periods of time
  - supported by technical assets (IMINT, SIGINT)
- **Promote synergy**
  - with Afghan officials
  - with Afghan forces (Police, AMF... )
  - with Pakistani officials

# Lessons learned in Afghanistan


- **Global approach**
  - Understand the stakes for everyone in order to provide the proper answers
  - Perform in a global manner, on all fronts at the same time
- **Tactical approach**
  - No dichotomy between Intelligence and action. Go from cooperation to synergy
  - Be versatile to respond to emerging situations
  - Master the effects of your behavior



**NDIA Conference 2005**  
**Future of Civil Affairs on the Battlefield**


**Role of the Institution:  
Past, Present, & Future**

**COL Michael G. Rose**  
Chief of Staff  
USA John F. Kennedy  
Special Warfare Center and School



# Role of the Institution: Past, Present, & Future


- *Past*
  - Proponent of branch museum and archives
  - History of branches and associated skills
  - Integrate the history into the current force



# Role of the Institution: Past, Present, & Future

- *Present*
  - Sustain training base and support deployments
  - Codify tactics, techniques, and procedures
  - Conduct simulations and experimentation
  - Annual health of the branch
  - Annual functional reviews





# Role of the Institution: Past, Present, & Future

- *Future*
  - Organizational and Operational Concepts
  - Force Modernization
  - Ensure complete analysis of the DOTML-PF
  - Force Design Updates Analysis

# ***COMSOCEUR's STRATEGIC VISION***

***A Theater Perspective on Coalition Warfare***



**COL Mark D. Rosengard  
SOJ3**



# *Setting Regional Conditions for the GWOT...*

- **What can (should) be done:**
  - In coordination with “Find / Fix / Finish” effort, and...
  - ... before we swing the “Golden Hammer”
- **Fight globally, but PREVENT regionally**
- **Requires willing and capable friends...**
  - ... synergistic effort
  - ... a Coalition
- **Just Like SOF – capable coalitions cannot be created overnight !!**



1. Theater Campaign Plan for WOT
2. Theater Security Cooperation Strategy
3. EUCOM Support to Emergent Operations

*Strategic Guidance*




**DELIBERATE ENGAGEMENT**


Key Tasks: Find – Capture or Kill – Neutralize

**UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

Key Tasks: Enable – Improve – Deny – Access



**END STATE:**  
REDUCED  
TERRORIST  
NETWORK,  
RESOURCES,  
AND  
SANCTUARY






# SOCEUR's Theater Strategy

*(Nested in EUCOM's WOT Campaign)*

● GWOT INTEREST


● PARTNERS

● CENTCOM AOR




## ■ Africa Statistics

- Length: ~ 5000 mi
- Width: ~ 4700 mi
- Coast line: 18,976 mi
- Area: 11,608,000 sq mi
- Highest point: 19,341 ft
- **Population: 807,419,000**



## Operational Framework








# Coalition Warfare

Achieving Desired Effect - By, With, and Through  
*Intrinsic* and *Extrinsic* Capability

**Geographical Leverage Points**

- Main Effort
- Sequential Supporting Effort Cycle
- Simultaneous Supporting Efforts



Increasing Effort  
Expanding Influence





# Lines of Operation

**Center of Gravity:**

**Set conditions to attack  
Critical Vulnerabilities**

**Maneuver (Main Effort)**

Build Units

Develop joint  
capability

Develop  
Regional  
Capability

Expand Zone  
of Influence

**Information  
Operations**

Improve Host Nation  
legitimacy

Promote regional  
capability

Discrediting  
Islamic extremism

**Civil Military  
Operations**

Shape, Key  
areas for Civic Action

Unity of  
interagency effort

Develop HN CMO  
Capability

**Intel  
Collection**

PIR/  
Collection  
Plans

Intel  
Assets

Intel  
Sharing

**Operational  
Reach**

Coordinate  
Fuels Initiative

Improve  
APODS

Develop  
intra-regional  
log spt.

Develop  
HN Gov't  
Infrastructure

**TERRORIST FREEDOM OF ACTION**

**IN**

**UNCONTROLLED SPACES**

Deny LOCs

Deny Sources  
of Support

Deny  
Sanctuary

Pacify  
Population  
of  
Terrorist  
Sympathies

**End State**

Environmental  
Change

Decisive  
Points



# PAN-SAHEL INITIATIVE

## INTRINSIC FORCES


Safe haven for extremists; borders are unable to be regulated or patrolled due to enormous size

Terrorist organizations operate throughout the Sahel

1/10th Special Forces Group teaches mounted infantry tactics to soldiers from the Malian Army in Timbuktu, Mali

1/10th Special Forces Group teaches mounted infantry tactics to soldiers from the Malian Army in Nouakchott, Mauritania

Interiors are too large to enforce laws






# ***Enabling SOF Partners Initiative***

## **EXTRINSIC FORCES**

- **Seeks to expand upon traditionally bilateral activities**
- **Matches strengths from one, with requirements elsewhere in the coalition**
- **Intent is to Increase:**
  - **Regional Capabilities to accomplish mutual objectives**
  - **Interoperability among SOF capable nations**
  - **Participation in WOT**
- **Potential Future Activities:**
  - **Flintlock - TSCTI**
  - **Mediterranean**
  - **Trans-Caucasus**
  - **Gulf of Guinea**
  - ***Out of AOR ??***





# Way Ahead...

## **PREVENTION, before Pre-emption:** *(SOCEUR's Operational Imperatives)*

- Get ahead of the enemy in potential sanctuaries...
- Develop and maintain strong links with coalition partners...

**“To wait for terrorist threats to become clear and present is to leave the nation vulnerable to terrorist attacks.”**

**- John Lewis Gaddis**





# ***COMSOCEUR's STRATEGIC VISION***

***A Theater Perspectives on Coalition Warfare***



**COL Mark D. Rosengard  
SOJ3**

**Remarks by Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel**  
**to the 16<sup>th</sup> Annual Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Symposium**

February 3, 2004

Marriott Wardman Hotel, Washington, DC

*An Ambassador's Perspective on Coalition Operations*

I know this is a somewhat over used expression, but one cannot deny that the world changed after September 11<sup>th</sup>. In actuality the attacks on the United States simply brought the recognition that the world had already changed and an emerging evil needed to be dealt with, and dealt with on a worldwide scale. No longer could nations stand idly by.

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Some key realizations spring forth when one looks at confronting the foe. The first is that a nation can ill afford to just build a fortress. We cannot give the enemy safe harbor. We cannot cede to him the time to plan, to recruit, and to act at place of his choosing. No longer can large standing armies ensure that a nation is protected and safe. Wherever possible we must take this fight to the enemy, denying him safe harbor, denying him rest, and denying him the choice of the battleground. You know that these new missions of asymmetric warfare require transformation. We need to move from legacy force into expeditionary, lethal, interoperable and flexible forces.

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We must engage this fight with all able countries to rid us of this common threat to our common values of - life, liberty and peace.

The age of coalition warfare is truly upon us and this is will not be a one-time event. But, we had better get it right, if we are going to be successful. To live together in peace, we must fight together in war.

The question at hand is how do you do this, and where does the Embassy fit? I am not sure most of you have a picture of what an Embassy does in peace, let alone during times of conflict? In the context of coalition operations it is of value to look at what the Embassy can do for you. Working with the Embassy can support not only implementation of coalition operations, but also the eventual success.

Let me begin this morning by asking some questions:

- First, did you know that the Netherlands has the 11<sup>th</sup> largest Economy in the world? Dutch companies like Shell, Philips, ING are among the worlds largest. And, the Netherlands has the 6<sup>th</sup> largest budget for foreign assistance in the world?
- Did you know that going into 2004 the Dutch ranked 4<sup>th</sup> in NATO in percentage of standing forces deployed?

- Do you know that the Netherlands is a consensus-based society? And, that all Dutch governments are coalitions and the Prime Minister is really the Minister of General Affairs. He must get the consensus from all coalition partners as well as the main opposition party for all major overseas deployments?
- Did you know that the Dutch are currently deployed in significant numbers in Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia?

If you don't know how the Dutch make their decisions then how can you bring the full range of capabilities – military, political/diplomatic, and economic – to bear in your operation? I am not proposing that you should, that is my job, and the Embassy's staff, which is commonly called a country team.

The Embassy can best understand what contributions the host country can make. Today it is not just military power but a collection of all the tools, which lead to a successful coalition. In today's world we must also be focused on peace support operations as well as post conflict reconstruction.

A nation can exert economic power with the enforcement of sanctions, or conversely with the infusion of money into development programs. It might exert political power by showing public worldwide solidarity against non-democratic regimes. Or support for embargoes, as in the case of the present EU arms embargo on China.

My role as an Ambassador is essentially to lead the effort in country to build and maintain the coalition. Whether it be heavy brigades, F16s, or special forces. Whether it's denying Al Qaeda access to finances, or sharing intelligence, intercepting suspected terrorists, or simply working together in the political arena to put pressure on less cooperative regimes. Being part of a coalition is not just force generation.

A coalition partner may make available their own airfields and ports as the Dutch did by supporting our movement of troops of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division through Schiphol Airport or by our movement of the equipment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, through the port of Rotterdam en route to the conflict in Iraq.

In fact, this is a perfect time to illustrate how an Embassy team on very short notice can respond effectively to facilitate your operations. When 25 trains of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division were denied passage through southern Europe during the Iraqi build up, it was the seamless efforts of our country team with the government of the Netherlands, which enabled the trains to be turned around and pushed through Rotterdam harbor for trans-loading literally in a few days. The Political Section and DAO had to notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry. Using existing agreements, DAO and ODC addressed their counterparts at the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Staff and the National Command to request assistance for the transit.

The Dutch called up their reserves for force protection, port militarization, and waterside security because of anti-war activists whom we all anticipated would attempt to disrupt the transit. I personally, with my political and public diplomacy sections, worked with the Mayor, the ministers, and members of parliament to get political and public support. And, finally DAO and ODC had to work with Ministry of Defense so that US guards on the trains were replaced by Dutch military as the trains entered the Netherlands. This happened quickly and efficiently because of the close relationships the country team had with their counterparts.

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It is important to remember that military coalitions are political arrangements. Countries, like individuals tend to make decisions based upon their own best interests. We are tasked in knowing what those interests are.

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Even the most sophisticated political and military leaders are sometimes baffled by the decisions countries make. The Embassy must measure and if necessary help build the political will for action. And just as importantly sustain the commitment until the mission is complete. Which is often the most challenging part of the job. I use as an example, working with the Dutch towards their two extensions in Iraq, which was just as vital to the overall mission, as their initial commitment.

It is incumbent upon the country team to have those personal relationships, not only to get insight, but also to deal with the difficult situations we know will arise. There is no substitute to having these relationships grounded in mutual trust.

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Let us also not forget a request for support should not be looked at as an isolated decision-making event. If the host country has any capacity, the request is one in a line of requests, initiatives, programs and operations from multiple sources.

As an example, the Netherlands notes that almost 80 percent of its deployable land forces are either currently deployed, preparing for deployments or recovering from deployments in EUFOR, ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom, or the NATO Response Force (NRF).

Each and every one of these requests is part of the life cycle of the operation and the decision-making process. This is all supported by a "network" of relationships.

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It is important to note that one of these relationships is the Embassy's relationship with Washington. Not only are we responsible for getting timely information to the host country, it is equally important to convey the information to Washington, all of Washington. As the Ambassador I set the tone for that relationship and my country team does the yeoman's work to ensure we are speaking with one voice, to ensure Washington is confident in our abilities to understand and articulate back the situation in our host country. The key is reporting with timely, focused and relevant information to the users.

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Another key relationship is the State Department relationship with the military. The Embassy is where State and DOD merge. It's my job to make sure there are no walls within the Embassy. That there is a collaborative environment that ensures that we speak with one voice to the host country and with a unified response back to Washington in the best "one team, one fight" tradition.

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In short, a successful Embassy team forges connectivity between State, OSD, JCS, and EUCOM creating a shared understanding of the situation and the way ahead.

On the other side of the network is the relationship of the Embassy with the host nation – it focuses on government, parliamentarians, military, opinion makers, academics, and the media. With all these elements involved, it is important to make sure there is good communication between all the parts.

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So how does the Embassy make this network of relationships work?

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Here it is important to understand that military planning many times precedes the political decision-making process. The military officers in this room are forward leaning and ready to respond to developing situations not dissimilar to an Embassy. You are aware of what you can offer long before the political apparatus makes a decision to act. Your job mandates your ability to anticipate and prepare. The political decision-making process however, is much more deliberate. We all know that in the end it is governments and nations that say "yes," not Ministries of Defense.

We also know that having capability without the political will is useless. As the Ambassador it is my job to have insight into the motivations and concerns of the host nation. We all must be good listeners. This is vital to understanding how to get a "yes" on deployment and to ensuring staying power when the going gets tough.

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Who are the players within a government? What's the national security decision making process? In coalition governments other cabinet ministers might be crucial.

So, we have to constantly respond to a long list of questions. We need to know who the key players are? Who are the parliamentary committee chairmen? Who are the leaders of the opposition parties? And equally important... who are on the editorial boards of key newspapers, because media and public opinion can make or break a coalition.

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On what grounds will a decision be based? Every country is motivated not only by the future, but also by the past. The Dutch experience in Srebrenica remains a factor in every decision on whether to deploy Dutch forces. Is there adequate force protection, an exit strategy? Is there a moral imperative? Does geography play a role? Is it an area of national interest like a former colony? What are the politics – does government have a domestic or foreign policy reason for wanting to participate?

The point is – cracking the code on the factors and the people involved in a decision before asking permits you to maximize the chance of success.



You might find it interesting to know what questions I ask my team when faced with the prospect of seeking support from my host country. A good Embassy is like the military. We have to anticipate. We should be asking ourselves:

- What's the mission that might arise?
- What capabilities can our coalition partner offer? Deleted: they
- What current commitments might hinder their participation? What could we lose by seeking another mission? Competing demands put the Embassy on the front lines of the process of prioritization.
- Under what auspices does the operation take place? The Netherlands, like many other countries, places tremendous value on NATO. Also, the passage of a UN Security Council resolution can facilitate Dutch participation.
- Are there adequate measures in place to address concerns about in extremis extraction, medevac and Intel sharing? Have we identified "must have" equipment and is it available?
- Will we know the answers to the questions before we ask?
- Is there a process to resolve conflicts in perspectives, means, operational goals, national caveats? And, is there a system to share immediate threats in order to protect the forces of all partners?
- What is the political climate and is there political will on the issue? What would be their motivation for committing to the coalition? If you asked the Dutch they would tell you that their motivation is divided into two parts. Deleted: ill  
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- First and foremost the Netherlands has a four hundred-year history of being involved on a global basis. It is a prosperous nation. For that reason the Dutch feel they have a real responsibility to the world beyond their borders, both in foreign aid and support for international security operations. As General Dick Berlijn, the CHOD would say, to whom much is given, much is required.
- Secondly, coalitions allow them to perform operations that alone, would be beyond their reach. There is a synergy in Dutch thinking to coalition operations.

As you all know, you need the right equipment to meet the military challenges of the future. This makes a long-term commitment to interoperability or even better standardization a prerequisite. This is an area where companies play a key role. With the exception of certain niches, our allies and partners need access to US weaponry and technology if they are to operate effectively in coalitions. This requires us to break down barriers between national defense industries. If you want them to stand shoulder to shoulder, you need to be sensitive over the long run -- to their requirements for a capable force.

This has been a key goal at our Embassy. We have sought to encourage our Dutch allies to invest in the kinds of power projection hardware that give them teeth. We need to meet future challenges together. The JSF is a good example of working with allies to give them the next generation of equipment so we can fight together.

One consideration I want to note, is as the European Defense Agency, grows in size and scope, it is critically important that we coordinate and work with them so we have interoperability and that we are maximizing our joint and scarce R&D dollars.

So far I've been discussing the Embassy's involvement in engaging potential coalition partners. The challenges are even more complex when dealing with an Embassy who must facilitate coalition operations within the host country's borders. Fortunately, I have not had that pleasure.

My point here is simple, engage the Embassy early and utilize their input and expertise.

The key is to remember that the Ambassador and his country team have a 360-degree view of the issues of his host country. We are also where all of the various elements of Washington come together. The key is to involve the country team up front in the planning process. Build an email network that brings in all the key players that are involved in a particular country at State, OSD, JCS, and the geographic commands. Don't just share operational requests. Use all the resources you can to be able to get as much input as possible before you make the request. Bounce briefing papers off each other for a reality check. This is a good way to learn what all the elements are that may affect your mission. As you plan you should be asking yourself, what would the Ambassador need to know to be effective in gaining the agreements we need.

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"Keeping the Embassy involved in the decision-making process" is very different from "keeping the Embassy informed."

My compliments to those planners who send out preliminary feelers looking for feedback from my country team, on their concepts and thoughts, before moving forward. Let the Embassy solve it at the front end instead of picking up the pieces at the back end.

Bottom line...."Long distance" may be the "next best thing to being there," but you don't want "second best" going into a fight. When all is said and done what I want you to take away from this that in the long battle ahead, no one country can afford to go it alone. I repeat the key to living together in peace is fighting together in war. Our country team is your partner in maximizing the coalition. Establishing the relationship early keeps us informed. And together we can build and maintain successful coalitions.

# PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS MODERNIZATION

NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRY  
ASSOCIATION

3 FEB 2005

STEVEN C. SPEER, BRIG GEN (AF Ret)

# DISCUSSION

- 911 FORWARD
- MODERNIZATION PLANS
- CURRENT STATUS OF AB PSYOP
- EC-130J ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF SME
- ROADMAP TO FUTURE
- ACTD
- QUESTIONS

# 911 FORWARD

- JOINT PLANNING WITH 4<sup>TH</sup> POG
- AFGHANISTAN
  - DEPLOYED SEPT, A/C RTN MAY 02
- DEPLOYED OCT 02 – SOUTHCOM
- DEPLOYED NOV 02 – CENTCOM
  - RETURNED SUMMER 03
- SOUTHCOM (RECURRING)
- CONVERSION



# AF MODERNIZATION PLANS

- CONGRESSIONAL ADD OF EC-130J
  - 6 A/C OVER 7 YEARS, 2 REMAINING
  - EXTENSIVE MODIFICATIONS
  - “CROSSDECK” – REPLACE 40+ Y/O A/C
- 3 A/C MODIFIED TO COMMANDO SOLO
  - TWO A/C “SUPER J”
- SOCOM REPROGRAMMING IN 2003
  - LED TO ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF CONCEPT

# EC-130J SUPER "J"



# EC-130J COMMANDO SOLO





# CURRENT STATUS OF AB PSYOP

- 2 REMAINING EC-130E's
  - PHASED OUT FY06
- 3 EC-130J's SOLO's DELIVERED
  - COMPLETING TESTING
  - UNDERGOING DEFENSIVE MODIFICATIONS AND SOFTWARE UPDATE
  - SPARES

# MODULAR COMMANDO SOLO

- 3/2 EC-130 SUPER J's TO BE MODIFIED TO "MODULAR COMMANDO SOLO"
  - NAVAIR IS SOCOM'S LEAD
  - RADIO ONLY (35% MORE TX), HIGHER, NEW TECH, R&M
  - A/C "TRUCK" CAN DO OTHER MISSIONS
- SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT
- IOC SEPT 07



# ROADMAP TO FUTURE

- PGR (PSYOP GLOBAL REACH) PROG
  - GAME PLAN TO TRANSFORM PSYOP
  - DEMONSTRATIONS
- LONG RANGE BROADCAST SYSTEM
  - COMMERCIAL QUALITY TV/RADIO
  - 800 MI RANGE INTO DENIED AREAS
  - MULTIPLE PLATFORMS,GRD SUPPORT
  - AOA EXPECTED SUMMER 2005

# LRBS

- Future system of systems that will be available to the PSYOP operator consisting of multiple solutions, such as:
  - Traditional broadcast alternatives: AM/FM/VHF/UHF/HF
  - Non-traditional broadcast alternatives: internet broadcasting, satellites, scatterable media, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)s, Direct Satellite Broadcasts (DSB), cellular/wireless

# ACTD

- CY 05 -WSADS DEMONSTRATION
- CY06 – A160 DEMO
- FUTURE
  - UAV
  - HIGH ALTITUDE AIRSHIP

# WSADS



# FUTURE





# CONCLUSIONS

- PSYOP IN TRANSITION
  - THE ROAD IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS
- PRIORITY IN FUNDING WILL DRIVE ROADMAP
- TECHNOLOGY – UAV, INTERNET, SPACE IS HERE
- DEDICATED COMMUNITY

# QUESTIONS

# EC-130J (CS)





# RCT 1 CMO/PSYOPS EXPERIENCES (OIF)



COL JOHN TOOLAN, USMC

# Urban Battlefield

## Premium on Human Capital



**“What was needed was for us to act so that every house in which we had even one soldier became a fortress against the enemy. All would be well if every soldier fighting in a basement or under the stairs, knowing the general task facing the army, stood his ground alone and accomplished the task on his own. In street fighting a soldier is on occasion his own general. He needed to be given correct guidance and, so to speak, the trust of the generals.”**

**-- Marshal Vasili I. Chukov  
Defender of Stalingrad**




**“ Our most effective weapon remains the individual Marine who out-learns, out-thinks, and out-fights any adversary.”**

**-- General M. W. Hagee  
33<sup>rd</sup> CMC**






# CJTF-7





## AO RALEIGH / JOA IRON (RCT 1 ZONES)





# ***ESSENTIAL TASKS***

- MSR/INFRASTRUCTURE (MUST DO)
  - MSR Mobile & Tampa, Power plant, oil
  - storage, railroad and ASPS
- SUSTAINED INFLUENCE (MUST DO)
  - Falluja, Karmah, NWS
  - ISF: Monitor, Train Joint Ops (WC)
  - Engage Leadership (WC)
- COMBAT TERRORISM (WC)
  - Disrupt AIF activity



# *DUAL-TRACK OPERATAION*



- **DEFEAT THE INSURGENTS**
- **DIMINISH THE CONDITIONS FUELING THE INSURGENCY**
  - **PERFORMED SIMULTANEOUSLY**
  - **WRAPPED IN A “BODYGUARD OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS”**

# *CMO OPERATIONS*



- **COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)**
- **POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL**
- **HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**
- **MILITARY CIVIC ACTION**
- **CIVIL ADMINISTRATION**



# COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)



UNCLASSIFIED



# POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL



# ***HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE***



UNCLASSIFIED



# ***HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE***



UNCLASSIFIED

# ***MILITARY CIVIC ACTION***



UNCLASSIFIED



# ***MILITARY CIVIC ACTION***



UNCLASSIFIED

# CIVIL ADMINISTRATION



UNCLASSIFIED



# FALLUJA BRIGADE





# ***INFORMATION OPERATIONS***



**PHOTO SHOP**



**UNCLASSIFIED**


# INFORMATION OPERATIONS



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# FALLUJAH ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITY




# *Questions?*



UNCLASSIFIED



## Area of Operation







# THE SOF WARRIOR:

*A DISRUPTIVE FORCE  
IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT*


3 February 2005

Mr. J. Frank Wattenbarger  
Director, Advanced Technology  
Directorate



# USSOCOM MISSION AND CORE TASKS

- **Mission**: “USSOCOM Plans, Directs, and Executes Special Operations in the Conduct of the War On Terrorism in Order to Disrupt, Defeat, and Destroy Terrorist Networks That Threaten the United States, Its Citizens and Interests Worldwide.....”
- **Core Tasks**








# USSOCOM OPERATIONAL FOCUS

- Method: Find, Fix, Finish, and Follow Up
  - Find Using Full Range Of Sensors, ISR, Analysis, HUMINT, ...
  - Fix Using Superior Fires, Mobility, Agility, and Pervasive Communications
  - Finish Terrorists Wherever They Are Operating
    - Eliminate Safe Havens, Leadership, Training, and Membership Via Lethal/Direct Action Capabilities
  - Follow Up to Achieve Stability and Erosion of Base for Future Terrorists
- Very Good at Finishing - Need to Improve Find and Fix



Advanced Sensors






Superior Fire



# OSD DESIGNATED DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

- Directed Energy Technologies
  - Non-Lethal Directed Energy
  - Prime Power/High Temperature Superconductivity
  - High Power Microwave (HPM) Attack
  - EMP and HPM Protection
  - Thermal Management
  - Phased Array Laser System
- Distributed Systems for ISR
- CBRNE Non-Intrusive Detection
- Virtual Training
- Individual Soldier Protection Systems








# USSOCOM'S DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

- USSOCOM has Experience in Several Technologies Considered as *Disruptive*: Advanced Tactical Laser, Active Denial System, UAV Payloads, Psychological Operations, and Special Operations Platforms

**However...The Most Important, Enduring, Core Disruptive Element of USSOCOM is the SOF Operator**

- Application of SOF in Any of the USSOCOM Assigned Core Tasks is Inherently a Disruptive Action. It is This Capability That USSOCOM Proposes to Enhance and Make More Disruptive by Use of Additional Technologies that Enhance/Enable the SOF Warrior's Capabilities



Advanced Tactical Laser



Pointer UAV



# BACKGROUND: THE BASIS OF THE NEED

- Through Exhaustive Training, Which Includes Language and Cultural Skills, **SOF Deploys Into Remote Areas**, Works With Indigenous Personnel, Coalition Forces, and Enemy Supporters. Through Close Interaction With the Local Populations, **SOF Reaps Valuable Intelligence For GWOT - Find and Fix!**
- The OPTEMPO Often Demands Rapid Transition Into New Areas, Languages, Cultural Roots, Etc. and Necessitates Forces **Train and Prepare Whenever** the Operator Has Time
- In Such Employments the Operator Must Be Self-Sufficient, Survivable, Equipped With Advanced Information Mining Tools, and **Naturally Occurring in The Environment**
- SOF Operates Alone in Austere Environments With Only the Items They Can Carry





# “CULTURAL CHAMELEON” OVERVIEW


- **Immersive (Injectable) Regionalized Training**: Access to Advanced Training Technologies for Rapid Adaptation to the Culture, Language Variations, Complex TTP's, And To Provide The Basis To Conduct Rapid And Intensive Training To Indigenous Surrogate Forces – **Localized Fluency In All Languages**; Seemlessly **Blend Into Any Cultural Environment**



Ruggedized Multi-Function Tablet



Immersive Headset



Tactical Neural Nano-Implant





# “CULTURAL CHAMELEON” OVERVIEW


- **Influence And Perception Enablers:** Access to Technologies and Methods That Persuade Target Audiences to a Desired Course of Action (With Verification), and Allow That Operator to Develop Extremely Strong Rapport With an Understanding of All or Targeted Members of the Indigenous Population






# "CULTURAL CHAMELEON" OVERVIEW

- Protection, Concealment, and Lightweight Sustainment Equipment
  - Have Integrated Self-protection Capabilities From Weapons, Puncture, and Blunt Trauma - Indestructibility
  - Appear to Be Standard Regional Dress, and Be Undetectable by Contact Search or Standard Detection Devices (Metal Detectors, Radars, Etc.)



Carbon Nanotube Armor




Adaptive Intelligent Laminates





# “CULTURAL CHAMELEON” OVERVIEW

- Sensors, Communications and Weapons
  - Extend All Senses - e.g. Have Enhanced Biological Sensors, to See, Hear or Otherwise Better Sense in Day, Night and Through Obscurants and Noise; Be Able To Detect Stress Or Unusual Behavior
  - Robust LPI/D Communications
  - Integrated Tunable Lethality
  - Leave Behind Small Undetectable Persistent and Pervasive Sensors That Will Provide Long Term (>5 Years) Video, Audio and Other Hyper-Spectral and Extra-Spectral Coverage.



Sensory Enhancing Nanobots



Tunable Directed Energy Weapon



Microbots “Recon Roach”




# “SHAPE SHIFT” OVERVIEW

- **Undetected Insertion Anywhere on Globe:** Provide Technologies That Enable SOF Platforms, Equipment and Operators to Be **“Invisible” in All Media** (Air, Land, Sea), From All Senses, From All Sensors, in Any Environment



Outline and Thermal Masking




Full Spectrum Masking





# “SHAPE SHIFT” OVERVIEW

- **Movement At Will**: Provide Technologies That Enable SOF Equipment and Operators to Blend With Any Environment So As to Be **Undetected in Plain View** While Conducting Sensitive Core Task Assignments



**Nano-Fabrics Self Heal, Self Clean, and Adopt Color and Texture of Surroundings**





# COMMANDER'S R&D FOCUS

- **SOF Warrior System**


- ***Enhanced Protection:*** Armor, Lightweight Sustainment Systems
- ***Enhanced Weaponry*** and Night Vision Devices and Other Individual Sensors
- ***Signature Management*** and Other Countermeasures in All Environments
- ***Sense the Enemy*** Regardless of Concealment

- **Sensors**

- ***Unmanned, Semi-Autonomous/Autonomous Robotic Systems***
- ***Enhanced, Novel Sensors – Remote and Body Worn***

- **Power and Energy**

- ***Continuous Operation***
- ***Emits No signature***
- ***Lightweight, Reliable, Effective***



# CONCLUSION

- Proposed Initiatives Will Provide Substantial Increases in Lethality, Survivability, Communications, and Stealth Capabilities for Individual Warfighters in the GWOT
- These Continuously Evolving Capability Increases Will Allow SOF to Not Only Conduct Find and Fix Operations Globally, But Also to Disrupt or Even Disintegrate the Terrorist Organizations

